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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In recent years many law schools have instituted loan repayment
assistance programs (LRAPs) intended to encourage law graduates to work
in public interest areas such as legal aid.' The typical LRAP provides for
cancellation of some part of the student's educational loans for each year
of such public interest work, or for work in any law-related area if the
graduate earns less than a ceiling amount. Schools provide the LRAP
benefits either by direct cancellation of the original loans, or if the loans
are in the hands of a third party, by periodic cash payments to the
participant to be used to pay down the original loans. The cash payments
may be structured either as outright grants or as new cancelable loans.
The purpose of LRAPs is to assist lawyers who would like to pursue
public interest careers but would otherwise be forced into more
remunerative private practice in order to support the crushing burden of
servicing student loans.
This article addresses the question whether LRAP benefits are taxable
as income. The question is unresolved, and to some extent even unasked,
but it is becoming increasingly important as the number and size of legal
LRAPs continue to expand. 2
Although there is no published authority regarding the tax effects of
LRAPs for legal education,3 most if not all of the law schools which offer
LRAPs have assumed that the financial assistance is taxable income to the
participant. No law school or LRAP participant seems to have challenged
this interpretation. Many national law schools report the financial
assistance as income by sending 1099 Information Forms to participants
1. Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunitiesfor Public Interest Careers,

NAPIL CLOSE-UP (Nat'l Ass'n for Pub. Interest Law, Washington, D.C.), Fall 1994,
at 3 (reporting that 49 law schools now have such programs). In addition, six states have
LRAP programs funded by state bar foundations, state interest on lawyers' trust accounts
programs, or direct state legislative funding. Id.
2. New York University (NYU) School of Law began a $10,000,000 program in the
fall of 1995 which can pay the entire cost of a law student's education, worth as much
as $40,000 per year, if the graduate remains in public interest law for 10 years. The
program is large enough to accommodate half of the entering class of 420 students for
the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. See William Celis 3d, Tuition for Public Service Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1994, at A25.
3. Except for a 1991 law review article. See J. Timothy Phillips & Timothy G.
Hatfield, Uncle Sam Gets the Goidmine-Students Get the Shaft: FederalTax Treatment
of Student Loan Forgiveness, 15 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 249 (1991). The article
concluded that law school LRAPs are probably taxable; however, the analysis is brief
and does not refer to the historical sources relied upon in this article.
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and to the IRS.' Information reporting is clearly not required if LRAPs

are a form of scholarship, however, even if they are a taxable form of
scholarship.'
This article concludes that LRAP benefits should be
regarded as tax-free scholarships at least to the extent they are allocable
to law school tuition loans.
The widespread belief that LRAP benefits are taxable is apparently
due to two related sources. First, LRAPs do not meet the literal
requirement of I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) which allows exclusion of student loan
cancellations that are conditioned upon the student's employment in certain

professions or designated areas but only if the source of the LRAP loan
funds is a governmental entity. The source of law school LRAP funds is
largely private. If one assumes that I.R.C. § 108(f) is the exclusive route

to protection for student loan forgiveness, LRAP benefits would be
taxable.
The second source is Revenue Ruling 73-256,6 which held that
forgiveness of state-provided medical school loans is taxable if conditioned
upon the graduate's practicing medicine for a term of years in an
underserved area of the state. The IRS held that the LRAP failed the test
of Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) which provides that a scholarship is
taxable if the student must perform substantial future services, or if the
primary beneficiary of the scholarship is the grantor. The Supreme
4. For example, NYU Law School's 1994-95 information brochure describing the
Melvyn and Barbara Weiss Loan Repayment Assistance Program flatly states that "LRAP
proceeds are taxable as 'other income'" and that the University will mail participants a
Form 1099. NYU's assistance takes the form of cash payments to the participant who
is required to use the funds to pay down loans. Harvard and Yale Law Schools also pay
cash and also send Forms 1099. Columbia School of Law makes participants new
interim cancelable loans to pay down existing debt, and when the interim loans are
canceled, Columbia also sends Forms 1099. By contrast, certain other law schools which
use the interim loan system do not send Forms 1099 when the interim loans are forgiven.
These schools did not wish to be mentioned here.
5. I.R.S. Notice 87-31, 1987-1 C.B. 475 states very clearly that unless a scholarship
is treated as wages under I.R.C. § 117(c) and wage withholding is required, no Form
1099 need be filed. Id. at 477. See also Announcement 93-2, 1993 I.R.B. 39, § 342.9
(same). Thus even where part of a scholarship is clearly taxable, such as amounts for
living expenses rather than tuition, the school is expressly exempted from information
reporting. It is clear that LRAP participants are not employees of their law school. If
LRAPs do not qualify as tax-free scholarships, they are at least arguably "scholarships,"
and it is the responsibility of the recipient, not the grantor, to determine whether a
scholarship is taxable. Id. at 478; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, PuB. No. 520, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS 3 (1994).

6. 1973-1 C.B. 56, discussed and criticized infra notes 65-67, 156-161 and
accompanying text.
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Court's decision in Bingler v. Johnson7 is usually cited as upholding these
regulations and interpreting them as imposing a quid pro quo test.

It was evidently for these reasons that when Senators Bumpers and
Danforth introduced a bill in 1993 which was intended to make law-school
LRAPs tax-free,' they too asserted that legal LRAPs are taxable under
current law. 9 No action was' taken on the bill,' ° which would have
amended I.R.C. § 108(f) essentially by deleting the current requirement
that the source of loan funds must be a government entity. "
Senator Bumpers stated that no tax policy supports treating privatelyfunded LRAPs differently from publicly-funded ones, and pointed out that

the sole reason for the limitation in current I.R.C. § 108(f) appears to be
the absence of any privately-funded LRAPs during the mid-1970's when
the provision was enacted.'
The bill would merely bring I.R.C. §
108(f) up to date, and would not represent any departure from existing tax

policy.13 The bill died in 1993 without any action having been taken and
has not been reintroduced. The forecast for a legislative resolution seems
dim.
7. 394 U.S. 741 (1969) (holding that engineers employed by Westinghouse
Corporation who received 70-90% of regular salary while on nine month leave to
complete doctoral dissertation received taxable income-not excludible
fellowships-where stipends were withheld upon as salaries, taxpayers continued to
receive employee benefits during leave, and had agreed to return to Westinghouse's
employment for at least two years after leave).
8. S. 914, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1993).
9. 139 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
10. Although according to Senator Bumpers, the bill is strongly supported by the
American Bar Association, the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the National
Association for Public Interest Law, the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association,
the National Association for Law Placement, the Project Advisory Group, and the
Association of American Law Schools. Id. at S5648.
11. Although S. 914, supra note 8, is primarily aimed at law school loan
forgiveness, it would apply to a number of other professions as well. Senator Bumpers
stated that LRAPs are now available at the Kennedy School of Government, and the
Harvard and Stanford Business Schools. 139 CONG. Rc. S5648 (daily ed. May 6,
1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
12. 139 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
The statement seems accurate. Harvard was the first law school to introduce an LRAP
in 1974, and for the following 12 years Harvard was virtually alone. The idea began to
catch on at other schools after 1985. See Student Loans: Be Good, EcONOMIST, Nov.
11, 1989, at 36.
13. 139 CONG. REc. S5648 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
The Joint Committee on Taxation found that any revenue loss from the bill would be
negligible.
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The belief that LRAPs are taxable was bolstered by the Tax Court's
1993 decision in Porten v. Commissioner'" which held that forgiveness
of college tuition loans granted by the State of Alaska is taxable where
conditioned upon the graduate's continuing residency in the state, citing
as support Revenue Ruling 73-256. The court also held that I.R.C. §
108(f) is preemptive of the LRAP area and that the Alaska plan did not fit
the literal terms of I.R.C. § 108(f) because it was not limited to "certain
professions."
I disagree with the Porten court's conclusions which are based upon
excessive deference to Revenue Ruling 73-256 and upon a failure to
explore the IRS' earlier and sounder position on the same issue.' 5 It
appears to be forgotten now that for thirteen years, until its abrupt and
unexplained change of position in Revenue Ruling 73-256, the IRS had
held that the medical LRAP and other similar LRAPs for higher education
were tax-free scholarships because the public-service requirement was not
for the benefit of the grantor, but rather for the public at large so that the
service requirement was not compensatory in nature. The IRS explained
its change of position in Revenue Ruling 73-256 as compelled by Bingler
v. Johnson, but in fact nothing in the Johnson decision required
reconsideration of the earlier LRAP rulings.
Also forgotten is the fact that Congress explicitly disapproved both the
reasoning and result of Revenue Ruling 73-256. In fact, Congress enacted
the predecessor of I.R.C. § 108(f) expressly in order to overrule Revenue
Ruling 73-256 and to reinstate the tax-free status of these and similar
LRAPs as scholarships.' 6 This history casts considerable doubt both
upon the authority of Revenue Ruling 73-256, and upon the theory that
Congress intended I.R.C. § 108(f) to be preemptive of the area of student
loan relief.
Recently the IRS seems to have drifted back to its former position that
public-service requirements are noncompensatory. In Private Letter Ruling
(PLR) 9526020,17 the IRS ruled that an outright grant of law school
tuition is a tax-free scholarship even if the recipient is contractually
obligated to work in public interest law for ten years and must pay a
penalty for breach of the condition. There is no difference of substance
between such a grant and a tuition loan which is cancelable under the
same conditions. And except for timing, about which the IRS has never
14. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993). This is the sole reported court decision
regarding LRAPs of any kind. The decision is criticized infra notes 115-134 and 139-

149.
15. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 68-72 and 131-134 and accompanying text.
17. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9526020 (Apr. 3, 1995). This is the only ruling which addresses

a law school LRAP.
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made an issue, there is little or no difference between either of these and
postgraduate LRAP cash payments which are intended to pay for tuition
loans. Indeed, if a proper request were made, the IRS might even issue
a favorable ruling.
This article will examine afresh the question whether law school
LRAPs may be tax-free scholarships or rebates of tuition for reasons
which have escaped those who have assumed the IRS' position on the
question. Part II of this article provides background on the nature and
purpose of LRAPs and on the history of their tax treatment. Part III
analyzes this tax treatment and argues that LRAPs are not taxable under
current law, at least to the extent the benefits are allocable to relief from
law school tuition loans, on the ground that in the final analysis, LRAP
benefits are simply rebates of tuition.

II.BACKGROUND
A. Nature and Purpose of LRAPs
All law school LRAPs have as their common purpose the
advancement of public interest law by means of financial aid to graduates
to offset the high cost of law school and low remuneration of public
interest work.'" Both factors have exacerbated a persistent shortage of
public interest lawyers. 9 The National Association for Public Interest
Law (NAPIL) reports that in 1991-92, more than 50% of law school
graduates left school owing between $40,000 and $79,999. Starting
salaries in the public interest sector declined from a median of $32,000 in
18. Not all observers agree that law school LRAPs are desirable, however. See
generally Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan ForgivenessDivine? Another View, 59 GEo. WASH.

L. REV. 451 (1991). Professor Zubrow argues that LRAPs may encourage increased
student indebtedness and unfairly reward borrowers at the expense of savers. She
contends that if LRAPs are desirable at all, they should be confined to subsidizinglegal
aid to the poor and should not be available for public-issue advocacy work or for
government employees. She further maintains that LRAPs are an inefficient means of
providing aid to the poor, and that direct grants to legal aid societies or the establishment
of fellowships would be more efficient. However, Professor Zubrow appears to assume,
in her economic analysis, that LRAPs are taxable to the participants. Finally, Professor
Zubrow questions whether encouragement of public interest law of any kind is a proper
function of law schools except where it directly contributes to the education of students,
such as aid provided through live student clinics.
19. See William P. Hoyle, High Cost ofDoing Good, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 96
(discussing the need for more LRAP programs to alleviate the shortage of public interest
lawyers and urging the institution of a comprehensive federally funded plan. Such an
LRAP program would presumably be tax-free under current I.R.C. § 108(t) because it
is federally funded.).
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1989 to $27,000 in 1993.' Most graduates cannot afford to set aside
more than 10% of their annual income for student loan repayment. 2'
According to this formula, law students who have educational debts of
$40,000 need an annual income of over $60,000 in order to repay the
loans during the usual 10-year repayment period.'
All LRAPs are need-based both at the time of making the initial loan
or grant during law school, and again at the time the aid is actually
granted, generally by means of imposing income and net-worth ceilings
as a qualification for relief.1 There is great variety among LRAPs
regarding other conditions for participation. Many plans condition
eligibility upon employment by non-profit tax-exempt entities such as legal
aid corporations; other plans include positions with federal, state or local
governments as well, but exclude judicial clerkships; still others include
judicial clerkships and even private-firm employment provided that a
substantial percentage of the participant's work is spent on public interest
or pro-bono cases (e.g., Northeastern and Tulane); and some have
expanded participation to include "all law-related employment."24 At
NYU, Harvard, and Yale, eligibility is solely need-based and is measured
by compensation ceilings.
The method of dispensing the financial aid also varies widely. When
the law school is itself the lender and holds the graduate's note, relief
takes the form of periodically reducing part of the principal and interest
owed.' When the note is held by a third party lender, as is more usual,
the law school may either: (1) pay the participant periodic cash amounts
with which to pay down the original loan; or (2) make periodic cancelable
interim loans to the participant for the same purpose; or (3) make
payments directly to the original lender on the participant's behalf. Many
law school LRAPs include repayment of undergraduate loans as well.27
20. See Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunitiesfor Public Interest
Careers, supra note 1, at 3 (citing a study by the National Association for Law

Placement).
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, THE NAPIL LOAN
REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT (rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter NAPIL
REPORT].

24. See Loan Repayment Assistance Creating Opportunitiesfor Public Interest

Careers,supra note 1, at 3.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.at 4-5.
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Some LRAP programs even pay extra amounts intended to defray the
participant's real or imagined income tax burden on the basic LRAP
benefits.'

Due to the great variety of existing and possible LRAPs, including
those used to finance undergraduate education as well as medical and other
professional training, this article does not purport to address the tax
treatment of each and every one, but rather it is limited to the reported
authorities and to general principles.
B. History of Tax Exclusion for Scholarships
Before 1954, although no specific Internal Revenue Code provision
governed scholarships, they were excludible under the general provision
exempting gifts. Like other gifts, scholarships were not excludible if they
were in effect a disguised method of providing compensation for services.
The IRS ruled in 1951 that an educational grant was an excludible gift if
it provided "for the training and education of an individual, either as part
of his program in acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his
educational development, no services being rendered as compensation
therefor. "29
When Congress enacted I.R.C. § 117 in 1954 as a specific exclusion
for scholarships, it did not intend to limit the exclusion under prior law,
but rather to expand its scope 0 and to provide a bright-line rule to avoid
28. NYU, Harvard, and Yale all provide such assistance for income taxes, despite
uncertainty whether any tax is actually owed. Harvard pays a fixed additional 25%, and

both NYU and Yale pay an additional 39% to compensate for the fact that the tax
reimbursements are themselves taxable under Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner, 279
U.S. 716 (1929) (holding that employer's payment of employee's income taxes was
additional compensation taxable to the employee).
The National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program which finances
medical education similarly makes additional payments to the recipient of 39% (or more
if appropriate) as an estimated reimbursement for the tax liability to the recipient. 42
U.S.C. § 2541-1(g)(c)(3)(a) (1994). The IRS has ruled this program to be taxable,
although the correctness of the ruling may be doubted. See infra notes 107-112 and
accompanying text.
29. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 C.B. 8, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 69-43, 1969-1 C.B.
310.
30. One of the purposes of I.R.C. § 117 was to preserve the scholarship exclusion
from the possible consequences of the Supreme Court's 1952 decision regarding prizes
and awards in Robertson v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 711 (1952) (holding that cash
award provided by philanthropist for best symphonic work submitted in contest was not
an excludible gift but payment for services pursuant to offer and acceptance of contract,
despite lack of any economic benefit to philanthropist). Until 1954, prizes and awards
had also been excludible under the general provision for gifts. In 1954, Congress
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the voluminous and troublesome case-by-case litigation under prior law

over whether a given educational grant was made with donative intent.

Under the 1954 version of I.R.C. § 117, it became immaterial that a

degree candidate performed teaching or research services if such services

were required for all degree candidates. 3 2 Nondegree candidates were

limited to an exclusion of $300 per month for an aggregate total of 36
months.
The aim of providing a bright-line rule was not achieved, however,
partly because Congress failed to define the terms "scholarship" and
enacted the Robertson holding into new I.R.C. § 74 so that the exclusion of awards
would apply to past achievements but not to accomplishments performed in order to
compete for an award. Congress protected I.R.C. § 117 from the reach of Robertson,
however, by specifically providing that if a grant was both a prize and a scholarship it
is treated under I.R.C. § 117 so that scholarships which are awarded competitively on
the basis of scholastic merit would continue to enjoy the exclusion. See 1 Bolus I.
BITTI=R & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF INCOME, ESTATES

GIFTs 11.2.1 (2d ed. 1989).
31. The House Committee Report states that:
The basic ruling of the Internal Revenue Service which states that the amount
of a grant or fellowship is includible in gross income unless it can be
established to be a gift provides no clear-cut method of distinguishing between
taxable and nontaxable grants. Hence, the tax status of these grants presently
must be decided on a case-by-case method.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
32. The rule was designed to liberalize pre-1954 law which Congress felt too often
resulted in taxing scholarships of students who performed teaching and research. The
House Report explained:
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the
performance of teaching or research services, the exclusion is not to apply to
that portion which represents payments which are in effect a wage or salary.
The amount included will be determined by reference to the going rates of pay
for similar services. This allocation of the amount of the grant between
taxable and nontaxable portions represents more liberal treatment than is
allowed under present practice. Present law taxes the grant in its entirety
unless services required of the recipient are nominal.
This limitation on the exclusion will not result in the taxation of the
portion of the grant which involves research or teaching services performed
primarily for the training and education of the recipient.
Id. at 17. The Senate version of the bill, which was the version actually enacted, added
"other services" to the "teaching or research" covered by the House version, but
liberalized the House version still further by providing that "if teaching, research, or
other services are required of all candidates for a particular degree (whether or not
recipients of scholarship or fellowship grants) such services are not to be regarded as
part-time employment." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1954). It seems
clear that all the services referred to in both versions concerned only those performed
directly for the grantor institution.
AND
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"fellowship," and also because the Treasury promulgated regulations
under new I.R.C. § 117 which reintroduced the old donative-intent test in
a new guise.33 The result was continued if not increased case-by-case
litigation and growing uncertainty. Most of the difficulties involved
medically-related disciplines where on-the-job training for degrees or
specialty licensing and stipends for post-graduate research advanced the
recipients' education while at the same time benefitting hospitals or other
institutional grantors.34
Many commentators observed that the 1954

legislation as interpreted by the Treasury Regulations was hardly

distinguishable from the law which prevailed under the 1939 Code.3'
The scholarship exclusion under I.R.C. § 117 was substantially
eroded in 1986. Congress repealed the exemption for teaching, research
or other services which are required for all degree candidates whether or
not on scholarship, thus making scholarships taxable to the extent of the
value of all such services provided. In addition, Congress repealed the
exclusion for fellowships for non-degree candidates altogether,3" thus
ending the flood of litigation over postgraduate stipends for medical
residents and fellows. Most importantly, Congress limited the exclusion
33. These regulations provided that the scholarship exclusion did not apply to any
grant which "(1) . . .represents either compensation for past, present, or future
employment services or represents payment for services which are subject to the direction
or supervision of the grantor[, or] (2) . . . [is for] studies or research primarily for the
benefit of the grantor." Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1956).
34. For details of the immense body of inconsistent decisions and rulings, see, e.g.,
Donald H. Gordon, ScholarshipandFellowship Grantsas Income:A Searchfor Treasury
Policy, 1960 WASH. U. L.Q. 144, 144-51 (1960); William W. Stuart, Tax Status of
Scholarshipand Fellowship Grants:Frustrationof Legislative Purpose and Approaches
to Obtain the Exclusion Granted By Congress, 25 EMoRY L.J. 357, 360 (1976); Mary
Ann Tucker, FederalIncome Taxation of Scholarships and Fellowships: A Practical
Analysis, 8 IND. L. REv. 749, 756 (1975). The basic problem with the "primary
purpose" or "benefit" test is that all grants result in some benefit to both grantor and
grantee and the regulations fail to specify in any detail how the relative benefits are to
be weighted. As a result, the courts reached conflicting decisions. See Stuart, supra, at
367.
35. See Stuart, supra note 34, at 376, 379-85 and sources cited therein (discussing
that at least since Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), the compensation versus gift
(or quid pro quo) issue has been the primary test of scholarship status and the analysis
is essentially the same as the unsatisfactory approach under the 1939 Code which
Congress attempted to eliminate in 1954); see also Gordon, supra note 34, at 151
(observing that due to the Treasury's position, the 1954 reform resulted in little change
from prior law, and rightly complaining that the Treasury's focus on the narrow gift
versus compensation issue failed to recognize the essentially unique nature of educational
grants).
36. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 123, 100 Stat. 2085, 2112
(codified at I.R.C. § 117(a) (1994)).
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for degree candidates to amounts for qualified tuition and related expenses
Thus it must be
and made all grants for living expenses taxable. 37
remembered in the following discussion that pre-1987 tax law remains
applicable only to the extent of tuition and related expenses of degree
candidates.
C. Pre-Bingler v. Johnson Tax Exclusion for LRAPs
The first IRS pronouncement on the subject of LRAPs was PLR
5604265200A 38 which held taxable a state-funded LRAP under which
medical school loans were forgiven over a five-year period if the student
practiced medicine in a rural area of Mississippi. The ruling, which
concerned itself principally with the timing of the income, did not explain
why the LRAP was taxable, and apparently assumed that the LRAP was
either compensation or income from cancellation of indebtedness. The
ruling also held that the Mississippi plan could not qualify as a scholarship
because it was in the form of a loan. The ruling noted that "[i]nasmuch
as amounts received under the program are loans, and inasmuch as they
must be repaid (either in cash or by service), they cannot be considered
scholarship payments exempt from tax under section 117 of the Code." 39
Two years after PLR 5604265200A, the taxpayer requested the IRS
to reconsider, and it did so in PLR 5807039700A' ° which came to the
opposite conclusion and revoked the earlier ruling. The second PLR was
based upon General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 30,7004 which
determined that the Mississippi plan was a scholarship and excludible
under I.R.C. § 117. GCM 30,700 reasoned that the state was neither the
employer of the grantee nor had the right to direct or supervise the
grantee's practice of medicine. The requirement of practicing in a rural
area was simply a condition of the gift which was intended to ensure that
the primary purpose of the plan would be carried out, and was in no way
intended as compensation. In other words, the LRAP was held to be a
scholarship with a noncompensatory condition subsequent.
GCM 30,700 also prophetically suggested that "[t]he Assistant
Commissioner may wish to consider whether as a matter of policy it
would not be desirable to reach an answer favorable to the taxpayers in
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

I.R.C. § 117(b) (1994).
Apr. 26, 1956, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.
Id.
July 3, 1958, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.
May 27, 1958, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.
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this case because of the virtual certainty of relief legislation and the
probable loss of the issue in the event of litigation."42
The next ruling on LRAPs was PLR 6004275330A, 43 which
concerned loans under the National Defense Education Act of 19584
(NDEA) which were forgiven if the recipient performed teaching or
research afterwards. The ruling followed the reasoning of GCM 30,700.
As a result of national concern, if not panic, over the state of American
education in the wake of the Russian scientific achievement with Sputnik,
the NDEA established a variety of LRAPs designed to encourage talented
individuals to study and work in educational fields designated by the
government. The federal government provided NDEA educational loans
for students who planned to become elementary or high-school teachers,
and for especially talented students to engage in advanced study in the
sciences and foreign languages. The typical loan agreement called for
cancellation of 10% of the loan for each year of teaching or research up
to a maximum of 50% of the loan principal.
In PLR 6004275330A, the IRS ruled that this loan forgiveness was a
tax-free scholarship. The specific program concerned NDEA loan
contracts designed to enable graduate students in engineering to pursue a
doctoral degree and which were partially forgiven if the graduate engaged
in full-time teaching. After reciting Treasury Regulation § 1.1174(c)(1), 45 the IRS held that the loan forgiveness feature was outside these
restrictions. The reasoning of PLR 6004275330A is instructive:
There has been no employment relationship between the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which administers
Title II of the Act, and the recipient of a loan under that Act;
therefore, payments made pursuant thereto cannot be said to
represent compensation for past, present, or future services. The
manner in which recipients of loans under this program perform
their teaching duties, after graduation, is in no way subject to the
direction or supervision either by the grantor or the recipient's
institution of learning. Only a reasonable condition is imposed
upon the recipients of the Title II loans, which is to insure that
the interests of the nation are adequately safeguarded, in requiring
teaching services after completion of their education in partial
cancellation of loans granted to them.
42. Id. There was no litigation, but the prediction of relief legislation proved correct
when Congress enacted I.R.C. § 108(f). See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
43. Apr. 27, 1960, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.

44. Pub. L. No. 85-864, §§ 201-209, 72 Stat. 1580, 1584-86.
45. Supra note 33.
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. . . The conditions imposed under that program, as to the
forgiveness-of-loans, have been considered to be merely
contingent and not materially affecting the real nature of the
grants which are provided by Congress primarily for the
education and training of the student-recipients thereof. 46
The following year, GCM 31,8714' came to the same conclusion as
PLR 6004275330A regarding an NDEA loan which was partially forgiven
if the student taught in an elementary or secondary school anywhere in the
United States. 48 Thus the IRS regarded such conditional scholarships as
a kind of matching grant in which the grantor(s) advance funds (or forgive
prior advances) to students on condition that they subsequently employ the
education to provide a matching grant of services primarily for the benefit
of some broad segment of the public.
For the next thirteen years there were no further developments and the
law seemed clear and settled that public-interest LRAPs are tax-free
Then, in 1972, the IRS suddenly and unaccountably
scholarships.
reversed its position.4 9 It did so in purported reliance upon the Supreme
Court's 1969 decision in Bingler v. Johnson.'0 Although Johnson did not
concern an LRAP, it is the leading decision in the area of scholarships and
will be described next before resuming the story of LRAPs in the
following section.

46. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6004275330A (Apr. 27, 1960), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, RELS File.

47. Jan. 19, 1961, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.
48. The IRS reached similar conclusions regarding NDEA direct stipends as opposed
to LRAPs. For example, in Revenue Ruling 62-205, NDEA stipends for both degree and
nondegree candidates attending training institutes for student guidance and counseling,

and for modem foreign language instruction, were held tax-free scholarships on the
ground that the recipients owed no service either to the educational institution or to the
government. See Rev. Rul. 62-205, 1962-2 C.B. 43, 44-45.
On the other hand, where the recipients were paid NDEA project funds administered
by a college in return for specific services under the direction of the college to develop

and evaluate new techniques for the instruction of ninth-grade algebra, and the college
itself treated the amounts as "salaries," the amounts were held taxable. See Rev. Rul.
61-174, 1961-2 C.B. 28, 29.
49. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,498 (May 17, 1971), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, RELS File.

50. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

D. Bingler v. Johnson
By 1969, growing confusion over the taxation of employer-provided
paid educational leave led to a split in the Courts of Appeal which was
resolved by the Supreme Court in Bingler v. Johnson. The taxpayer was
an engineer who took a nine-month paid leave to complete his doctorate
in engineering while he remained on the Westinghouse payroll as an
employee and was obligated to return to full-time employment at
Westinghouse for at least two years at the end of his leave. The taxpayer
unsuccessfully challenged Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c)5 ' on the
ground that Congress had placed no limit on the dollar amount of
scholarships for degree candidates, and had enacted I.R.C. § 117 in order
to avoid the kind of case-by-case determinations of donative intent
necessary under the challenged regulation. 2 The Johnson Court held
that "[t]he thrust of the provision dealing with compensation [Treas. Reg.
§ 1.117-4(c)] is that bargained-for payments, given only as a 'quo' in
return for the quid of services rendered-whether past, present, or
future-should not be excludable from income as 'scholarship' funds.
That provision clearly covers this case. " " Immediately preceding the
last sentence of the above passage, footnote 32 of Johnson states:

51. Supra note 33.
52. It is not entirely clear that the decision in Johnson was correct under the law as
it then stood. I.R.C. § 117 as enacted by Congress in 1954 placed no restriction on the
amounts paid to degree candidates, whereas non-degree students were limited to stipends
of $300 per month for 36 months. Congress expressed concern in the legislative history
over stipends for nondegree students which were merely continuations of salary on leave,
but none regarding degree candidates. Because Congress apparently intended to
eliminate the compensation test for degree students in favor of a bright-line rule of
exclusion, there was a strong argument that an employment relationship should be
considered irrelevant if the scholarship is intended to further a degree student's studies,
and that the Treasury Regulations were unreasonable to the extent they provided
otherwise. The taxpayer in Johnson had family obligations and could not afford to take
a one year leave without pay in order to pursue his research for a doctorate, and so the
living stipend could very plausibly be regarded as a scholarship. The Third Circuit's
pro-taxpayer opinion was far from unreasonable. See Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258
(3d Cir. 1968); see also John Holt Myers, The Tax Status of Scholarships,22 TAX LAW.
391 (1969). On the other hand, testimony at trial established that the taxpayer's initial
employment was partly motivated by the possibility of later pursuing an advanced degree
at Westinghouse's expense, which points to a compensatory fringe-benefit analysis. See
Transcript of Proceedings, Bingler v. Johnson in U.S. Sup. CT., RECORDS & BRIEFS 2526 (1968).
53. Johnson, 394 U.S. at 757-58 (footnote omitted).
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We accept the suggestion in the Government's brief that the
second paragraph of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)-which excepts
from the definition of "scholarship" any payments that are paid
to an individual "to enable him to pursue studies or research
primarily for the benefit of the grantor"-is merely an adjunct to
the initial "compensation" provision:
By this paragraph, the Treasury has supplemented the
first in order to impose tax on bargained-for
arrangements that do not create an employer-employee
relation, as, for example, in the case of an independent
contractor.
But the general idea is the same:
'scholarship'
or 'fellowship'
does not include
arrangements where the recipient receives money and in
return provides a quid pro quo.51
In another much-quoted variation of its quid pro quo test, the Court used
the phrase "no strings" to describe an excludible scholarship: "Here, the
definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie proper,
comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of 'scholarships'
and 'fellowships' as relatively disinterested, 'no-strings' educational
grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from the

recipients. "5

It should be noted that the Johnson decision concerned only the
taxpayer's living stipend and ignored Westinghouse's reimbursements to
the taxpayer for tuition and fees.56

54. Id. at 758 n.32 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 22).
55. Id. at 751. The Court's use of the word "disinterested" echoed the Court's test

of "detached and disinterested generosity" for distinguishing gifts from compensation in
its 1960 decision Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding that the
non-contractual gratuitous transfer of a Cadillac from one businessman to another as a
token of appreciation for prior valuable services was not excludible as a gift under I.R.C.
§ 102). This suggests that the 'quid' must be in the economic interest of the grantor.
56. The IRS made no attempt to tax Westinghouse's reimbursement to the taxpayer
of the cost of tuition, books and fees, and these amounts were not even mentioned in the
decision. The government contended that "conceptually" the tuition and other
reimbursements should also be treated as income, but pointed out that an offsetting
deduction might be available to the taxpayer for business educational expenses under
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5. See Petitioner's Brief at 10 n.7.
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E. IRS Change of PositionAfter Bingler v. Johnson
Two years after Bingler v. Johnson, the IRS invoked the decision in
GCM 34,4985 to rescind its longstanding position regarding publicservice LRAPs. The IRS' change of position occurs at the very end of the
GCM, where it almost seems an afterthought, because the bulk of the
GCM concerned a very different question. The principal purpose of GCM
34,498 was to analyze a proposed revenue ruling, later published as
Revenue Ruling 71-380,58 which concerned cash amounts received by
project personnel who conducted advanced training sessions for gradeschool teachers under a program directed by a state educational agency,
but which was largely funded by the federal Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW). The GCM concluded that the payments
were taxable despite the lack of any direct employment relationship
between the project personnel and HEW. The principal authority cited
was Johnson.
GCM 34,498 seized upon footnote 32 of Johnson5 9 for the
proposition that both the institution providing funds and the institution
awarding or administering the grants are "grantors" within the meaning
of the regulations. GCM 34,498 also cited the post-Johnson Tax Court
decisions Turem v. Commissioner" and Haley v. Commissioner.6 The
taxpayers in both cases were required to perform specific services for a
specific employer who was one of the grantors, as in the proposed
Revenue Ruling 71-380 under consideration. After disposing of this ruling
with twelve pages of analysis, GCM 34,498 went on to revoke the NDEA
and Mississippi plan GCMs62 in a single page with only the most cursory
discussion, as if these public interest LRAPs involved the identical issue.
57. May 17, 1971, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File.

58. 1971-2 C.B. 101.
59. Johnson, 394 U.S. at 758 n.32, quoted in text at supra note 54.
60. 54 T.C. 1494, 1506-08 (1970) (holding that stipend paid by state welfare agency
to enable employee of county welfare agency to take leave for advanced degree was

taxable because recipient remained county employee while on leave and agreed to return
to county employment; interrelationship of state and county sufficiently close to consider
both to be "grantors").
61. 54 T.C. 642, 647 (1970) (holding that grant from Oregon State Welfare

Commission to county welfare employee for educational leave to earn advanced degree
in social work was taxable because taxpayer was obligated to accept county welfare

position afterwards as condition for grant).
62. Supra notes 41 & 47. GCM 34,498 also revoked GCM 33,375 which had
recommended proposed pro-taxpayer revenue rulings based upon GCMs 30,700 and
31,871. Thus none of the pro-taxpayer Mississippi plan and NDEA GCMs ever became
a public ruling.
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They clearly did not involve the same issue because the recipient of a
public-service LRAP owes no service to any grantor. 63 The GCM did not
mention the longstanding conditional-gift and public-benefit analyses it was
reversing, and its entire analysis consisted of the following statement:
In both GCM 30,700 and GCM 31,871, substantial services
were required of the grantees as a condition of the grant.
Although no employment relationship existed between grantor and
grantee, these services were designed to accomplish the basic
objectives of the grantors in both cases. Therefore, we now
conclude that the grants in both cases are not scholarships or
fellowships within the meaning of section 117 because they were
made primarily for the benefit of the grantor.'
The IRS made its reversal of position public in Revenue Ruling 73256,1 which considered precisely the same facts as the Mississippi plan
medical LRAP at issue in GCM 30,700 and PLR 5807039700A, 66 and
came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Revenue Ruling 73-256 gave
as its authority the "no strings" language in Johnson, and while admitting
that there was no employment relationship with the state, nevertheless
concluded that the scholarship was "primarily for the benefit of the
grantor" within the meaning of Treasury Regulations § 1.117-4(c). The
entire argument was contained in a single sentence:
Thus, although no employment relationship exists between the
grantor and the grantees, the services required do not further an
educational purpose and are designed to accomplish a basic
objective of the grantor.67
63.
64.
65.
66.

See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,498, supra note 57.
1973-1 C.B. 56.
July 3, 1958, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. See supranotes

41-43 and accompanying text.
67. This statement seems erroneous because many students who could not otherwise
afford to attend might be attracted to medical school by the LRAP, and thus the

educational purpose is identical to that of any other need-based scholarship: removal of
financial obstacles to education. Also, it is unquestionable that the ultimate aim of
LRAPs is to attract qualified persons to public service work permanently rather than
merely to obtain an agreed minimum term of service. Thus the educational purpose of
the scholarship is to train a public interestphysician.

The IRS itself may have been a little unsure of the soundness of its ruling, because
it later made Revenue Ruling 73-256 applicable prospectively only for loans made after
June 11, 1973. See Rev. Rul. 74-540, 1974-2 C.B. 38.
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F. Enactment of LR.C. Section 108(o
Congress soon repudiated Revenue Ruling 73-256, as had been
predicted in GCM 30,700.68 In 1976, Congress enacted a provision
exempting from tax any loan forgiveness pursuant to an LRAP requiring
the student to work for a certain period of time in certain professions for
any of a broad class of employers. The provision applied only if the loan
was made by federal, state or local government directly or pursuant to an
agreement with an educational institution. 69
The provision was
temporary, but was extended in 197870 and made permanent in 1984 as

I.R.C. § 108(f).7

Congress' reason for repudiating Revenue Ruling 73-256 was not to
carve out an exception to the Treasury Regulations. Rather, the legislative
history indicates in at least one place that Congress thought the IRS'
interpretation of the Regulations was simply wrong. The Joint Committee
report to the 1978 Act gives as its reason for rejecting the ruling:
Many states and cities have experienced difficulty in attracting
doctors, nurses, and teachers to serve certain areas, including
68. May 27, 1958, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, RELS File. See discussion
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
69. The provision related to I.R.C. § 61, rather than §§ 108 or 117. Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2117, 90 Stat. 1520, 1911 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
70. The provision was extended until January 1, 1983 by § 162 of the Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 162, 92 Stat. 2763, 2810 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
71. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1076, 98 Stat. 494, 1053
(codified at I.R.C. § 108(t) (1994)). This seems misplaced because that implies the relief
is an exception to I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) which treats discharge of indebtedness as gross
income. The provision should more logically have been put under I.R.C. § 117, because
the issue involves whether the loan forgiveness qualifies as a scholarship. It cannot be
income from discharge of indebtedness because the indebtedness is paid in full through
compliance with the conditions of the loan agreement.
The 1984 Act also made a few minor changes to the 1976 provision. These
included tightening the restriction against compensation by requiring the qualifying
employers to be from a broad class, thus precluding conditionment of loan forgiveness
on performance of services for a single employer or a small group of employers. Also,
the class of qualifying lenders was expanded to include public benefit hospital
corporations which are treated as governmental entities under applicable state law, since
these organizations perform a function which is essentially similar to governmentallyoperated hospitals. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICiT REDUCTION ACT
OF 1984, at 1200 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).
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both rural communities and low-income urban areas. A provision
in student loan programs for loan cancellation in certain
circumstances is intended to encourage the recipients, upon
graduation, to perform needed services in such areas. In these
circumstances, the loan cancellation is not primarily for the
benefit of the grantor (as the Service ruled in 1973), but for the
benefit of the entire community. The exclusion from income of the
amount of indebtedness discharged in exchange for these services
promotes the purpose of the programs.'
The IRS ignored the Joint Committee's criticism, however, and in
cases which did not conform precisely to the letter of I.R.C. § 108(f), it
continued to adhere to its position in Revenue Ruling 73-256. For
example, in Revenue Ruling 77-319,13 the IRS cited the quid pro quo
language of Johnson and its own Revenue Ruling 73-256 to hold that
National Research Service (NRS) awards for medical research were
taxable because they were conditioned upon the recipient's engaging
afterwards in an equivalent number of years of teaching or research, or in
medical practice in designated underserved areas. The NRS awards were
not covered by the 1976 legislative relief (which was not mentioned in the
ruling) because they are made in the form of outright grants which must
be repaid if the conditions are not met, rather than as cancelable loans. 74
In addition to the forbidden services, the IRS objected to another NRS
condition: the government had reserved the right to make royalty-free use
of any copyrighted materials produced during the award period. The IRS
construed this as an additional quid pro quo, although it seems trivial'
and had little or nothing to do with the principal purpose of the awards,
72. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 120-21 (Joint Comm. Print 1979)
(emphasis added). Very similar language appears in the 1976 explanation. The only
substantial difference is that instead of the first clause of the above-quoted italicized
sentence, the following clause appears instead: "Proponents of these programs believe
that .... " STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 630 (Joint Comm. Print 1976).
73. 1977-2 C.B. 48.

74. In principle, the quid pro quo test is the same for a cancelable note as for a
conditional grant if both are tested as scholarships. Note that the range of possibilities
for fulfillment of the NRS postgraduate obligation is far wider than under the Mississippi
plan.
75. See Stuart, supra note 34, at 380, 384-85. Stuart correctly pointed out that the
Johnson quid pro quo test resulted in "simplistic and mechanical" decisions turning on

minor matters such as publication rights to reach "illogical and unjust" results. These
decisions contradict the government's own Treasury Regulation § 1.1 17(4)(c)(2) which
states that an "incidental benefit" to the grantor will not preclude scholarship status.
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which was to assure the continued excellence of biomedical and behavioral
research in the United States.7 6

In 1978, Congress stepped in and legislatively overruled Revenue
Ruling 77-319 retroactively for awards made during years 1974 through
1979.1 In 1983, the IRS relented and reversed Revenue Ruling 77-319
in Revenue Ruling 83-9371 on the ground that changes made by the

Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 198171 rendered the ruling obsolete.
These changes consisted of dropping the service requirement as an
alternative, so that the only post-grant requirement for an NRS award
became health research or teaching, which was held to be in accordance
76. The IRS has displayed extreme aggressiveness in another aspect of medical
scholarship programs. In Hawronsky v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. No. 8 (1995), the Tax
Court denied the taxpayer physician a deduction for a statutorily compelled payment to
the government of triple damages for breach of his contract to complete his service of
years in the National Health Service Corps, on the theory that the damages constitute a
non-deductible "penalty" under I.R.C. § 162(f). The decision seems erroneous because
the treble damages are clearly labeled damages for breach of contract under 42 U.S.C.
254o(b) (1994), and Treasury Regulation § 1.162-21(b)(2) plainly states that
"compensatory damages... paid to a government do not constitute a fine or penalty."
Moreover, I.R.C. § 162(f) disallows only penalties "for the violation of any law," and
the taxpayer violates no law by breaching the contract. Ironically, several federal courts
had already rejected physicians' attempts to avoid payment of the treble damages on the
ground that they are a penalty and hence unenforceable, holding that the treble damages
clause represents "liquidated damages" rather than a "penalty."
Before NHSC scholarships became taxable in 1986 as a result of the repeal of
former I.R.C. § 117(c), the IRS had ruled that the treble damages were non-deductible
under a different and equally erroneous theory in PLR 8506050 (Nov. 13, 1984) and
again in GCM 39,336 (Oct. 12, 1984). The IRS admitted that the payment of damages
was a loss incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business, but denied the deduction by
invoking I.R.C. § 265(a) on the dubious ground that the damages were "directly
allocable" to the earlier receipt of the tax-free scholarship funds.
I.R.C. § 265(a) was enacted principally to prevent tax profits from arbitraging the
payment of deductible interest in order to earn tax-free municipal bond interest. In any
case I.R.C. § 265(a) applies only to expenses, not to losses, and the damages resemble
a loss from abandonment of a business far more than a current expense. A deduction for
loss of the principal of a municipal bond is unquestionably allowable despite the fact that
it is "directly allocable" to exempt income in precisely the same sense. Neither PLR
8506050 nor GCM 39,336 cited any authority or reasoning for its conclusion other than
the words of the statute itself.
77. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 161(b), 92 Stat. 2763, 2810
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
78. 1983-1 C.B. 364.
79. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
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with the usual patterns of academic employment and therefore not a
forbidden quid pro quo.80
G. Amended LR. C. Section 117 and Proposed Regulations
Current I.R.C. § 117(c) as amended in 1986 denies the scholarship
exclusion for any amount "which represents payment for teaching,
research, or other services by the student required as a condition for
receiving the qualified scholarship." 8' As explained above,8 2 the pre1987 version applied only to "services in the nature of part-time
employment" and even then it excepted any services which were required
of all degree candidates."2 Congress seems to have intended the prior
provision to apply solely to services performed by students for the
educational institution or its affiliates, although at least one reported
decision might imply a broader interpretation. In Ferris v.
Commissioner,"I the Tax Court held that hourly wages paid by Columbia
University to an undergraduate for part-time employment at a Better
Business Bureau as part of a work-study program were taxable
compensation for services under then I.R.C. § 117(b)(1). The decision
seems correct although it does not address the fact that Columbia
80. Rev. Rul. 83-93 did not specify what these changes were. A 1981 IRS internal
memorandum explains:
the only requirement is that a recipient subject to the payback satisfy a
commitment to engage in health research or teaching or any combination
thereof which is in accordancewith the usualpatternsof academicemployment

for the specified period. No longer is service in the National Health Corps,
service in a health maintenance organization in a medically underserved area,

or any other service a possible alternative.
I.R.S. Memorandum (emphasis added) (excerpted from incomplete I.R.S. Memorandum

kept on file with author).
The government's reserved right to any royalties was unchanged by the legislation,
however, and remains in 45 C.F.R. § 74.36 (1995). The I.R.S. Memorandum explained
that "[a]s a practical matter, however, there is no record that any copyright material has
ever been reported by a grantee. Moreover, the officials of the Public Health Service

are not aware of any instance where the Public Health Service has exercised the right to
royalty free use of copyrighted material."

I.R.S. Memorandum, supra.

81. I.R.C. § 117(c) (1994).
82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
83. I.R.C. § 117(b)(1) (1954). For legislative history, see supra note 32.
84. 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1989).
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apparently had no affiliation with the Bureau and derived no benefit from
the student's services.85
Current I.R.C. § 117(c) has potentially a far wider reach, and can be

interpreted as applying to post-graduation services such as those in Bingler
v. Johnson. 6 On the other hand, nothing in the legislative history of §
85. The taxpayer represented himself and did not raise the argument. If it had been
raised, however, the result would probably have been the same. Although the facts were
not developed in the decision, it appears that the work-study program was largely funded
by the federal government pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2754 (1988). Section 2751
states:
The purpose is to stimulate and promote the part-time employment of students
... who are in need of earnings from employment to pursue courses of study
at eligible institutions, and to encourage students receiving Federal student
financial assistance to participate in community service activities that will
benefit the Nation and engender in the students a sense of social responsibility
and commitment to the community.
Id. § 2751. The school administers work-study grants under an agreement with the
government to place students in public interest part-time employment. Columbia's
program is still in existence substantially as it was in 1985, the tax year in question in
Ferris, and the Better Business Bureau is still one of the many approved participating
employers. Columbia pays the student by the hour according to time sheets provided by
the Bureau, withholds upon the wages and sends a Form W-2. The government
reimburses Columbia for 70% of the expense, and the Bureau reimburses Columbia the
other 30%. Telephone Interview with Maribel Longi, Assistant Director, Columbia
Work-Study Program (Mar. 17, 1995).
The 30% paid by the Bureau is necessarily wages. The government's 70% is
probably also wages, because Congress intended the program to provide "earnings from
part-time employment" rather than a scholarship, and also because the student is paid by
the hour. Note that this situation is easily distinguishable from LRAPs where the
participant is fully compensated by the employer. Also, LRAP benefits are not
determined by hours worked, but rather by the amount of student indebtedness and
financial need.
86. 394 U.S. 741 (1969). Evidence for this interpretation may be found in the
House Report. See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., v. II, at 16 (1986). The
1986 Act also repealed former I.R.C. § 117(c) which excluded from taxable income
grants under federal programs which were conditioned upon future employment for the
federal government. The House Report explained that such future services will no longer
be entitled to more favorable tax treatment than services for another employer, and the
"general rule" will apply. Id. The "general rule" referred to appears to be that of
current I.R.C. § 117(c) quoted in the text above. This is also the view of Bittker &
Lokken, who state:
The elimination of the reference to part-time work allows this language to be
the fulcrum of the scholarship versus compensation dichotomy. For years after
1986, the Bingler v. Johnson test should be reformulated as three questions:
(1) Did the student render services? (2) If so, were the services a condition for
receiving the award? (3) If so, was the award payment for the services? If all
three questions are answered affirmatively, the award is taxable compensation.
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117(c) indicates that Congress intended any substantive change in the
Bingler v. Johnson test, and as applied to post-graduation services, I.R.C.
§ 117(c) can be regarded as merely codifying the quid pro quo test as it
then existed under Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) and
Johnson.Y7
The "payment for services" language of I.R.C. § 117(c)
is highly ambiguous on the critical question regarding LRAPs: services for
whose benefit? Proposed Regulation § 1.117-6(d)(2), which interprets the
new statutory "payment for services" language, is as ambiguous as the
statute. It provides no guidance for the LRAP situation in which the
required services are performed for third parties, and provide no benefit
to the grantor.A
The Proposed Regulation is more elaborate than
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c), but it is in substance the same, 9
except that the "primarily for the benefit of the grantor" test was explicitly
abandoned as an independent criterion and rolled into the "services" or
quid pro quo test.' The Proposed Regulation provides six examples to
illustrate the payment-for-services test, but all six involve recipients who
perform services directly for the grantor." Thus, neither the amended
statute nor the Proposed Regulation sheds any light upon the LRAP
problem, and the applicable principles of law remain as they were before
1986.

The compensation stigma is avoided, in contrast, if any of the three is
answered no.
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 30, 11.2.2.
87. This appears to be the view of Bittker & Lokken as well, because their
explanation quoted supra note 86 simply restates the Johnson test. In addition, all three
of the 1994 I.R.S. Information Letters discussed infra notes 102-103, 107 and

accompanying text expressly state that the quid pro quo test remains unchanged.
88. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 111 (1988).
89. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(2) states:

Payment for services. For purposes of this section, a scholarship or
fellowship grant represents payment for services when the grantor requires the
recipient to perform services in return for the granting of the scholarship or
fellowship. A requirement that the recipient pursue studies, research, or other

activities primarily for the benefit of the grantor is treated as a requirement to
perform services.. . . A scholarship or fellowship grant conditioned upon
either past, present, or future teaching, research, or other services by the
recipient represents payment for services under this section.

Id.
90. This change merely recognizes the development in the case law after Bingler v.
Johnson. See discussion infra part III.B.
91. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(d)(5), 53 Fed. Reg. 111 (1988).
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H. Porten v. Commissioner
The sole reported court decision concerning an LRAP is Porten v.
Commissioner.' The decision does not concern legal education, but it
would certainly be cited as authority in any future litigation over a legal
LRAP. The LRAP program in Porten was instituted by the State of
Alaska in 1972 in order to stem a "brain drain" from the state. 3 The
state advanced loans to Alaska residents for college tuition and fees which
were partially forgiven for each year the graduate remained an Alaska
resident and was engaged in any form of employment without
limitation.'
For seventeen years the IRS made no attempt to tax
beneficiaries of the Alaska LRAP, and everyone assumed it was taxfree.95 In 1989, however, the IRS notified the Alaska Commission on
Postsecondary Education that it had determined the plan was taxable and
would make assessments retroactive one year to 1988.96 The IRS'
decision prompted an immediate reaction in Alaska. In a 1990 joint
resolution, the Alaska state legislature declared that its intent was to
provide tax-free scholarship grants,' and the Alaska delegation to
Congress proposed legislation to overturn the IRS decision
retroactively. 9 The Porten court took note of all this, but decided
against the taxpayer nonetheless.
After holding that the Alaska
legislature's characterization of the LRAP as a "scholarship" was not
controlling for federal tax purposes, the court went on to hold (1) that the
LRAP did not fall within the exclusion of I.R.C. § 108(f) because the loan
forgiveness was not conditioned upon employment in any particular
profession; (2) that the postgraduate requirement of Alaska residency was
92. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1994 (1993).
93. Id. at 1996. Although limited to Alaska residents, the LRAP was not restricted

to education within Alaska where opportunities were limited. The LRAP was designed
to fund the education of Alaskans at out-of-state institutions (provided they return to
Alaska after graduation) as well as to subsidize in-state education. See Letter from Rep.
Don Young (AL) to Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury (Oct. 12, 1989) (on
file with the New York Law School Law Review).
94. The grantee need not actually live or work in Alaska to maintain sufficient
contact to remain a legal resident. See Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1996.
95. See Letter from Rep. Don Young to Nicholas F. Brady, supra note 93.
96. See Letter from John Havelock, Chairman, Alaska Commission on
Postsecondary Education to LRAP recipients (May 30, 1990) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review).
97. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1995 (citing Alaska Leg. Res. No. 95 (1990)).
98. S. 1803, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Sen. Ted Stevens); H.R.
3518, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Rep. Don Young). Both proposed
bills died aborning.
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a significant quid pro quo within the meaning of Bingler v. Johnson; and
(3) that the loan forgiveness was not a gift on the ground that the
residency requirement indicated a lack of "detached and disinterested
generosity."' The Porten decision is criticized infra part III.
I. Private Letter Ruling 9526020
In PLR 9526020,'" widely believed to have been requested by
NYU, the IRS ruled that an outright grant of law school tuition is a taxfree scholarship even if the recipient is contractually obligated to work in
public interest law for ten years following graduation and is further
obligated to pay a penalty for breach of the condition. The IRS reasoned
as follows:
The service commitment imposed upon participants ... does not
constitute the requirement of a substantial quid pro quo from the
recipients; on the contrary, the grants are relatively disinterested
grants of the University, designed to accomplish public rather
than private or proprietary purposes. Recipients are free to take
nearly any position of their choosing, anywhere, subject only to
the compensation limitations prescribed. The service commitment
is essentially a de minimis limitation designed to assure that X's
graduates practice in all income sectors of the legal profession,
including public, lower-paying, and otherwise underserved areas
or capacities, a public purpose for which the M scholarship
program has been established by X. Any benefit inuring to the
University-grantor appears remote, insubstantial and
inconsequential for purposes of section 117(c).10 1
The holding of PLR 9526020 is not surprising in light of other recent
IRS Information Letters from the same office concerning conditional
grants for medical education which indicate that the IRS has significantly
relaxed its position on the public-service issue. The IRS advised that two
programs implemented by the Department of Health and Human Resources
(HHR) are tax-free scholarships: the Exceptional Financial Need (EFN)
scholarship,"~ and the Financial Assistance for Disadvantaged Health
99. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1994-96 (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 285 (1960)).
100. Apr. 3, 1995.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 293 (1994).
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Professions Students (FADHPS) scholarship,' °3 on the ground that the
post-graduation service requirement of a five-year term of primary care
practice is "in accordance with usual patterns of employment."'14 Also,
the IRS recently confirmed that NRS awards continue to be tax-free
scholarships under Revenue Ruling 83-93,1'° because the post-award
requirement of research or teaching for a term of years is similarly within
the usual patterns of employment.'0 6 Like the law school grant in PLR
9526020, all three programs involve outright grants with repayment
penalties rather than loans. However, all three arguably have narrower
ranges of choice for fulfillment of the service requirement than does the
law school grant. The EFN and FADHPS grants restrict the graduate to
practice in the field of primary medical care for which the specialized
training is provided, though without geographical limitation, and the NRS
grant requires teaching or research, which seems more restricted than
would be a requirement of medically-related work of any kind but with an
income ceiling.
The outer limits of the IRS' ruling position appeared in a third letter
relating to the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) scholarship
program," which is again a grant with a contractual service
103. 42 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1994). Under both programs, HHR provides grants to
schools of medicine, dentistry and other health professions for disbursement to needy
students to cover tuition, fees, books and other educational expenses. In the case of
students of medicine and osteopathy, the student must (1) complete the education for

which assistance is provided, (2)enter and complete a residency training program in a
primary health care specialty within four years of such completion, and (3)practice in
the specialty for five years following completion of the residency training. 42 U.S.C.
§ 295n(a) (1994). Failure to meet these conditions requires repayment of the award plus
interest. Id. § 295n(b).
104. The IRS explained its decision as follows: "The obligated service commitment
imposed upon participants in these two programs ., does not constitute the requirement
of a substantial quid pro quo from the recipients, in that recipients must engage only in
activities which are in accordance with usual patterns of academic or professional
employment." Information Letter from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax
& Accounting, Internal Revenue Service 3 (Sept. 26, 1994) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review).
105. 1983-1 C.B. 364. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
106. See Memorandum from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax &
Accounting, Internal Revenue Service 3 (Oct. 11, 1994) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).
107. Information Letter from Branch 6, Assistant Chief Counsel, Income Tax &
Accounting, Internal Revenue Service (Oct. 11, 1994) (on file with the New York Law
SchoolLaw Review). Participants in the NHSC program receive grants for both tuition
and living expenses in medical school, and are required to practice primary medical care
following their training in one of a number of designated medically underserved areas.
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requirement. The NHSC service requirement is to practice in a designated
underserved area of the graduate's choice.
The IRS regards this
requirement as a substantial quidpro quo which negates scholarship status,
despite the fact that participants generally do not work for the federal
government, but rather for locally-operated community or migrant health
centers 0 3 or even in private practice." °
The IRS' position is
apparently based on the fact that the NHSC has, in principle at least, the0
right to direct a given graduate to a given location of service,"
although it rarely exercises this right."' It is unclear whether the
offending factor is this right of control alone, or the fact that exercise of

such control may result in employment by the federal government. " 2
There are apparently no recent rulings concerning cancelable loans as

opposed to grants with conditions. PLR 9526020 states that the law
school grants are not loans even if the penalty feature might have the
effect of repayment, but it does not go on to explain the significance of
this finding, or whether the result would be different if the ruling request
had involved cancelable loans (or cash assistance for loan repayment) with
A substantial penalty (triple the amount of the award plus interest) is imposed for failure
to complete the service requirement. See id. at 2.
108. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTHAND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
CORPS SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995/ACADEMIC YEAR 1995-96, at
10 (Dec. 1994) (stating that most participants serve as employees of such centers and are
paid directly by the local health clinic). Participants may be federal employees if they
choose placements with the Indian Health Service or the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 11.
109. Id.
110. See I.R.S. Information Letter, supra note 107.
111. See generally id. (stating that the placement opportunity list for the NHSC will
contain three times the number of vacancies as recipients available for service, or 500
vacancies, whichever is less. However, the NHSC will determine the number of
available vacancies in a year if there are 500 or more recipients available for service.
Thus, the NHSC rarely directs a participant to a particular location and then only because
the participant has failed to select any one of the many hundreds of approved positions.
On the other hand, if the participant is directed to a location, it may be as a federal
employee.).
112. It is not clear that the IRS' position is justified in either case, except as applied
to an individual who actually does work for the federal government.
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the same service conditions."13 Somewhat oddly, no one has ever
requested such a ruling.
If such a ruling were requested, the result should in principle be the
same as in PLR 9526020: a tax-free scholarship, because the public
service requirement does not run afoul of the quid pro quo test, and that
test was the only reason the IRS gave for its reversal of position in 1972
when it 4decided that the NDEA and Mississippi plan LRAPs were
taxable.
On the other hand, the enactment of I.R.C. § 108(f) in the interim
may appear to have split off delayed financial aid in the form of LRAPs
as a separate category to which the general scholarship tests under I.R.C.
§ 117 are no longer applicable. The Porten decision appears to be some
authority for this view.
III. ANALYsIs: ARE LRAPs EXCLUDIBLE?
This Part will examine critically the authorities under which LRAPs
might be excludible. Parts A through E consider whether LRAPs may
qualify as scholarships and conclude that they do, and Parts F and G
examine whether an LRAP may be a price adjustment or a gift. Part H
considers a potential counterargument based upon horizontal equity, and
Part I explores the effects that clarifying the law might have upon
compliance.
A. Does LR.C. Section 108(o Preempt the LRAP Area?
If Congress intended I.R.C. § 108(f) to preempt the area, as the
Porten court stated, LRAPs for legal education would be taxable under
current law. Thus it is necessary to consider in some depth the intended
scope of I.R.C. § 108(f) and whether the Porten decision is correct." 5
113. NYU has three different public-service financial aid programs all running

simultaneously: a grant-with-contractual-service-commitment such as that described in
PLR 9526020; a grant-with-moral-commitment which is afortiori a tax-free scholarship;

and the Melvyn and Barbara Weiss LRAP which pays installments of cash. Recipients
of both types of grants, which are limited to 2/3 of tuition, are also eligible for the
LRAP assistance. The stated purpose of running all three programs is to make an
'experiment" to determine over the next 10 years which type is most effective in
encouraging public service law. See Public Service at NYU, NYU: THE LAw SCHOOL
MAGAZMNE, Spring 1995, at 60.

114. See discussion supra part ]I.E.
115. The taxpayer had only $268 at stake in the litigation and was not represented
by counsel. The decision was not appealed. Porten v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1994 (1993).
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The Alaska LRAP in Porten clearly does not fall within the protection
afforded by the literal language of I.R.C. § 108(f). The Porten court
might have denied the taxpayer's claim for protection under I.R.C. §
108(f) upon that fact alone, but it did not. By its terms, I.R.C. § 108(f)
applies only to loan discharges conditioned upon working "for a certain
period of time in certain professions for any of a broad class of
employers."" 6 The court stated that this language carries the "clear
implication" that "forgiveness of student loans, other than those identified
in the statute, gives rise to income from discharge of indebtedness."" 7
The court cited no authority supporting this conclusion, however, and
provided no reasoning to defend it. I.R.C. § 108(f) itself does not state
that it is the exclusive route to tax relief,"' nor is there any such
indication in the legislative history. If anything the reverse implication is
more persuasive for at least two reasons: (1) the language of I.R.C. §
108(f) implies that the provision is not exclusive, and (2) the legislative
history indicates that Congress simply intended to correct the IRS'
erroneous interpretation of existing law in Revenue Ruling 73-256 and did
not intend to create new law, preemptive or otherwise." 9
Current I.R.C. § 108(f)(1), enacted in 1984, reads as follows:
(f) Student loans.
(1) In general. In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be
includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole
Porten was decided by a Special Trial Judge rather than a Judge of the Tax Court

and was reported as a "memorandum" decision. Memorandum decisions of the Tax
Court are not officially published, and ordinarily involve the application of settled legal
principles to the facts rather than novel questions of law. See 4 BoRIs I. BITTKER &
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
115.2. 1.
(1992). As explained here and infra notes 139-149 and accompanying text, however, at

least two important legal questions of first impression were involved in Porten: (1)
whether I.R.C. § 108(f) is preemptive; and (2) if not, whether post-graduate conditions
providing no direct economic benefit to any grantor negate scholarship status. The court
failed to recognize that these were novel issues and simply embraced the IRS' positions
as if they were dictated by settled law and beyond discussion.
116. I.R.C. § 108(f)(1) (1994).

117. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCII) at 1996.
118. Congress might easily have provided that I.R.C. § 108(f) was preemptive had
it desired this result. Cf. the neighboring provision I.R.C. § 108(e)(1) which states,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, there shall be no insolvency exception

from the general rule that gross income includes income from the discharge of
indebtedness." I.R.C. § 108(e)(1) (1994).
119. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

or in part) of any student loan if such discharge was pursuant to

a provision of such loan under which all or part of the
indebtedness of the individual would be discharged if the

individual worked for a certain period of time
in certain
20
professions for any of a broad class of employers.1
It is this italicized clause which seems to imply that Congress thought

some LRAPs may be excludible even without the express protection of
I.R.C. § 108(f).

The clause was absent from both the 1976 and 1978

temporary versions of the provision. ' 2 Read literally, the clause appears
to be surplusage. If a loan discharge would have been excludible in any
case, the provision does not apply, but it need not apply because the
discharge is already excluded. Thus the italicized language seems
purposeless. 2
However, as the Porten court itself pointed out, it is an "'elementary
rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
120. I.R.C. § 108()(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
121. It is interesting to note that the Porten LRAP would have qualified under the
earlier versions which specified disjunctively either a geographic condition or a class-ofemployer restriction, but not both. The reason for the change is not apparent. The 1976
version reads as follows:
In the case of an individual, no amount shall be included in gross income
for purposes of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by reason of
the discharge of all or part of the indebtedness of the individual under a
student loan if such discharge was pursuant to a provision of such loan under
which all or part of the indebtedness of the individual would be discharged if
the individual worked for a certain period of time in certain geographical areas
or for certain classes of employers.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2117, 90 Stat. 1520, 1911. In 1978,
Congress changed the effective date of I.R.C. § 2117 to discharges of indebtedness made
before January 1, 1983. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 162, 92 Stat.
2763, 2810 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
122. One might argue to the contrary that if the loan discharge were excludible
outside I.R.C. § 108(t) by reason of the insolvency exception under I.R.C. §
108(a)(1)(B), attribute reduction would be required under I.R.C. § 108(b), and that the
effect of the italicized language is thus to subordinate loan forgiveness under I.R.C. §
108(f) to the insolvency exception.
This interpretation, however, seems far-fetched. Congress showed no concern for
this issue in the legislative history of I.R.C. § 108(0, and with good reason, because
student loans are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, except in
cases of undue hardship. See THOMAs D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS
15.07(3)(h) (rev. ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994). Also, it seems very
unlikely that a recipient of student loan forgiveness would ever have such tax attributes
as net operating losses or basis in non-exempt assets, especially in cases of discharge for
undue hardship.
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clause and sentence of a statute.' A statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant."'
It is always possible that the italicized clause is merely the product of
poor drafting. On the other hand, the language can be read as an attempt
to indicate that some student loan forgiveness may be excludible even if
it is outside the express conditions of I.R.C. § 108(f). Because the
provision explicitly applies only to forgiveness which is not otherwise
excludible, this implies the drafter contemplated that some student loan
forgiveness is (or at least may be) otherwise excludible. In short, the
language can be interpreted as an intentional statement that I.R.C. § 108(f)
is not preemptive of the area of LRAPs.
Some support for this interpretation can be found by analogy with the
neighboring provision I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) which contains nearly identical
language:
(5) Purchase-money debt reduction for solvent debtor treated
as price reduction. -If(A) the debt of a purchaser of property to the seller of such
property which arose out of the purchase of such property is
reduced,
(B) such reduction does not occur(i) in a title 11 case, or
(ii) when the purchaser is insolvent, and
(C) but for this paragraph, such reduction would be treated
as income to the purchaserfrom the discharge of indebtedness,

,

then such reduction shall be treated as a purchase price
adjustment. 24

123. Porten, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1997 (citing 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION, § 46.06 (1986) (citations omitted)). The Porten court did not discuss
the italicized language of § 108(t)() at all, but instead was referring to the phrase "in
certain professions" and arguing that it should not be read out of the statute. Id.
Perhaps not, but the absence of any restrictions at all as to the nature of employment
should logically help rather than hurt the taxpayer's case, because the greater his
freedom, the less resemblance there is to compensation for services. See also supra note
121 for qualification under statutory precursor to I.R.C. § 108(f).
124. I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
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The meaning of this italicized clause is no more obvious than that of

I.R.C. § 108(f)(1). However, it is clear that I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) is not
preemptive, but rather a kind of safe harbor. Current I.R.C. § 108(e)(5),

enacted in 1980,"' s provides that a reduction of a purchaser's debt to a
seller of property is treated as a purchase price adjustment if the debt is

still held by the seller and the reduction would otherwise be treated as
income from cancellation of indebtedness (COD).
Case law had
recognized such an exception to the rule of COD income since 1940.126
However, disputes as to its scope led Congress to codify the
exception.27 The provision is clearly not preemptive of the field of
price adjustments," and the IRS recently confirmed this by explicitly
ruling that the price adjustment rule survives outside the I.R.C. §
108(e)(5) safe harbor. 2 9

If the inartful "but-for-this-provision-would-be-income"

language of

I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) means simply that the subsection is not intended to
preclude tax-free treatment for transactions outside its terms, as appears
to be the case, the nearly identical language in neighboring I.R.C. § 108(f)
125. Enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat.
3389, 3393 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 26

U.S.C.).
126. See, e.g., Hirsch v. CIR, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding that where
taxpayer purchased property for cash and assumption of existing mortgage, and eight
years later mortgagee reduced debt in recognition of property's decline in value, debt
reduction was nontaxable price adjustment, not COD income). The courts placed
limitations on the doctrine of price reduction, however, for example, it did not apply if
the debt-financed property still had sufficient value to satisfy the entire debt. See, e.g.,
Coddon & Bros Inc. v. CIR, 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938); CIR v. Coastwise Transport Co.,
71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1934). Debt reduction has also been taxed if it did not result from
direct negotiations with the vendor-mortgagee, or if such negotiations concerned the debt
rather than the property. See Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth St. Corp. v. CIR, 147 F.2d 453
(2d Cir. 1944).
127. See S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1980), reprintedin 1980-2

C.B. at 628.
128. By its terms I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) applies only if debt reduction would otherwise
have been treated as COD income under prior case law. It was certainly not intended
to overrule Hirsch, and similar cases. I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) does not apply to Hirsch as a
technical matter, because such cases do not trigger COD income under longstanding case
law. See cases cited supra note 126.
129. See Rev. Rul. 92-99, 1992-2 C.B. 35 (debt reduction by holder of note who
is not the seller may qualify if the reduction clearly relates to the property rather than
the debt); see also Richard M. Lipton, New Rulings on PurchasePrice Reductions Do
Not ProvideMuch Relief, 78 J. TAX'N 68 (1993).
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enacted only four years later can plausibly be interpreted in the same
way.130 This interpretation at least gives meaning to statutory language
that would otherwise be mere surplusage.
This interpretation is also consistent with the history of I.R.C. §

108(f).

As noted above,13 Congress enacted the predecessor relief in

1976 and 1978 to reverse Revenue Ruling 73-256 on the ground that the
IRS had incorrectly interpreted its own regulations by failing to recognize
that the primary beneficiary of the Mississippi plan (and of NDEA loans
for teachers) was not the grantor, but rather the general public. Thus it
seems fair to say that Congress did not intend to change the law by

enacting I.R.C. § 108(f), but rather to clarify it by purging the IRS'
erroneous interpretation in Revenue Ruling 73-256.132
If this
interpretation is correct, it follows that to the extent the law governing
scholarships reasonably permits, LRAPs other than those within the I.R.C.
§ 108(f) safe harbor should also be excludible.
Because of their close resemblance to safe-harbor LRAPs, law school

LRAPs appear to be likely candidates for just such "nonqualifying" but
nonetheless excludible status as scholarships. The public-benefit rationale
of I.R.C. § 108(f) and of the IRS' pre-Bingler v. Johnson pro-taxpayer
position 33 seems to apply just as well to legal LRAPs as to the NDEA

and Mississippi plans. Public need for legal services seems hardly less
urgent than for medicine, nursing, and teaching, and is generally agreed
to be in extremely short supply for the needy."
130. Plausibly, but not certainly. An argument based upon symmetrical language
alone is always dangerous. See Richard A. Westin, Dubious InterpretativeRules for
ConstruingFederalTaxing Statutes, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1981) ("The tax
laws are such a hodgepodge of exceptions, qualifications, special interests and sometimes
logically inconsistent treatment that they cannot be treated as symmetrical exigeses.
Isic]") (quoting Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 772 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975)).
131. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
132. According to the Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, the "certain
professions" intended are medicine, nursing, and teaching. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984, at 1199 (Joint Comm. Print 1984). As enacted, however, I.R.C. § 108(t)
does not specify the "certain professions." This deliberate vagueness seems another
indication that Congress disapproved of the IRS' interpretation of the public-service
LRAP problem in general, and did not wish to limit its rejection to the specific result of
Revenue Ruling 73-256 as applied to a single profession or even a specified list of
favored professions.
133. See discussion supra part I.C.
134. See Zubrow, supra note 18, at 513-14; see also William J. Dean, The Legal
Services Corp., N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1994, at 3 (stating that nationally, it has been
estimated by the Legal Services Corporation that only about one-fifth of the needs of the
poor are being met); William J. Dean, Surveys of Activity in New York, N.Y. L.J., July
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Parts III.B through E analyze the general question whether I.R.C. §
117 permits exclusion of legal LRAPs as scholarships independently of
I.R.C. § 108(f).
B. The Primary Benefit Test
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) denies scholarship status to any
grant which is "primarily for the benefit of the grantor." The regulations
provide no examples for guidance as to its meaning, however. The IRS
and the courts have often invoked the primary-benefit language in order
to deny scholarship status, including Revenue Ruling 73-256 which ruled
against the Mississippi plan. 35 The primary-benefit test has always been
applied in conjunction with the compensation or "quid pro quo" test,
however, and seems not to be an independent criterion. This was
explicitly recognized in Bingler v. Johnson, where the Court (following
the IRS' own interpretation) termed the benefit test merely an adjunct to
the compensation issue.'3 6 Subsequent decisions confirmed this view
and regarded the Johnson decision as having melded the "principal
purpose," "control," and "compensation" tests into a single test. 37
This was a fortunate development, because scholarships by their
nature benefit many different parties, and if taken seriously, the primary
benefit test would be extremely difficult to apply. It seems safe to say that
all scholarship grantors intend that the subsidized education be put to some
useful purpose. If a student applied for financial aid with a statement of
intent to be utterly unemployed in any capacity and that the education was
purely for personal satisfaction or simply to meet a better class of people,
it is probable that the student would not even be accepted for admission,
let alone be awarded financial aid. By its nature a scholarship always
benefits at least four different parties: (1) the student whose financial
burden is reduced; (2) the school which can admit desirable students who
could not otherwise afford to attend; (3) the public at large which profits
generally from a better educated citizenry, and specifically from increased
1, 1994, at 3 (stating that a 1990 study by the New York State Bar Association estimated
that no more than 14% of the overall civil legal needs of the poor were being met).
The situation is hardly better on the criminal side. Public Defender offices are
everywhereunderstaffed and underfunded. Because of excessive caseloads, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recently created a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of

counsel in Section E of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. See State v. Peart, 621
So.2d 780 (La. 1993).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
136. 394 U.S. 746, 758 n.32 (1969); quoted supra in text accompanying note 54.

137. See, e.g., Kellogg v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9586 (D. Minn.
1979).
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availability of highly skilled services; and (4) governments at all levels
(federal, state, and local) which benefit from the prosperity which is
generally associated with increased levels of education through
enhancement of tax revenues, reduction of expenditures for welfare,
unemployment, and crime control, and increased availability of qualified
persons for government employment. To these beneficiaries may be
added: (5) the grantor (in case the funds do not derive from the school
itself) whose general or specific philanthropic aims are furthered. The
question of who is the "primary" beneficiary is thus not a simple one, 38
and it is fortunate that it is no longer necessary to pose the question
independently of the compensation or quid pro quo test.
C. The Quid Pro Quo Test
1. Residency as Quid Pro Quo: Porten
The Porten court held that in addition to failing to meet the literal
terms of the § 108(f) safe harbor, the Alaska plan failed the quid pro quo
test for scholarships as well. The court stated: "Petitioner earned her loan
forgiveness by fulfilling a condition subsequent to the granting of the loan:
completing her degree program and working in Alaska for a certain period
of time. The offer of loan forgiveness thus represented consideration for
remaining in Alaska."139
Completing the degree program obviously cannot be a forbidden quid
pro quo because it is a condition of all scholarships that the grant be used
for the student's education."4 To regard the post-graduation residency
requirement as valuable consideration raises a difficult question which the
court overlooked entirely. Why should it be treated any differently than
the pre-matriculation residency requirement of state universities which
provide a tuition discount to residents but not to out-of-state students? No
one has ever suggested that such discounts should be taxable as
compensation for meeting the residency requirement. The residency
requirement is intended simply to assure that the benefits of the subsidized
education enhance the general welfare of the state. The typical one-year
residency requirement is itself of no obvious value to the state, and it has
been correctly held that its purpose is merely to serve as evidence that the
student is a bona fide resident who intends to remain in the state
138. See Myers, supra note 52, at 399-401.

139. Porten v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCII) 1994, 1996 (1993).
140. It is equally obvious that no forbidden services are involved in scholarships

which are conditioned upon maintaining a certain grade point average or engaging in a
particular field of concentration.
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Intent to remain is more accurately measured after

graduation, and that seems the sole purpose of the Alaska LRAP
requirement. Thus the Porten residency requirement should be regarded

as a condition to ensure the general welfare of the people of Alaska rather
than as payment
for services of any sort to the government which granted
42

the funds.

A final irony lies in the fact that Congress had determined earlier that

the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend, which is paid to all Alaskans with

residency as the sole qualification, 4 3 is eligible dividend income for
purposes of the "kiddie tax" election under I.R.C. § 1(g)(7).14 Because
the kiddie tax applies only to unearned income, it appears to follow that

residency is not a service performed for the state.

Compensation for

services is earned income and not subject to the kiddie tax in the first
141. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (holding that state may not impose
irrebuttable rules defining residency which arbitrarily prevent applicants for in-state
tuition reduction from proving bona fide intent to remain domiciled in state).
142. Except perhaps indirectly, because to the extent that the state population
prospers and increases, so will the tax revenues and the power of the government. Note
that states are in constant and intense competition with one another to attract businesses
from elsewhere and to retain those already in the state, using a variety of means such as
tax holidays, preferential rates of borrowing, use of public lands, exemptions from
regulatory restrictions, and the like, all of which are of economic benefit to the recipient.
No one has ever suggested that such benefits should be taxable to the recipient as
compensation for the "service" or quid pro quo of coming to or remaining in the state.
To the extent the question has ever been considered at all, such benefits are treated as
tax-free gifts. For example, a state or municipal grant of land to a corporation as an
inducement for development is treated as a tax-free contribution to capital. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960).
143. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a) (1995).
144. I.R.C. § l(g)(7) (1994). The election applies to children's unearned income
"only from interest and dividends (including Alaska Permanent Fund dividends)." Id.
§ l(g)(7)(A)(i), enacted by § 6005 of Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3686. Indeed, enactment of the I.R.C. § l(g)(7)
election to include children's unearned income on parents' returns was prompted by
complaints from the Alaska delegation regarding the burden of filing kiddie tax returns
for the Permanent Fund dividend.
Permanent Fund dividends were held taxable as gross income in Beattie v. United
States, 635 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alaska 1986) (holding a Permanent Fund dividend not to
be a gift, but similar to a corporate dividend because it is distributed pursuant to statute
whose stated purpose was to fulfill state's duty and obligation to its citizens without
mention of charity or generosity), aff'd sub nom. Griesen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
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place. 45 Of course it is always possible that Congress might have
intended to regard state benefits provided solely for residency as earned
income for some purposes but not others. However, no very good reason
to do so leaps to mind.
It might be argued that the employment requirement, rather than mere
residency, represents the forbidden quid pro quo. The Porten court did
not explore this possibility. The loan agreement in Porten did not require
the participant to be employed in Alaska, as the court erroneously stated.
It required only that the participant must either work in Alaska or be
subject to Alaska state income tax, thus permitting employment out of
state if residency is maintained. In addition, each post-graduation year
spent attending" a college or university within Alaska counted as a year of
"employment. " Under these circumstances, the court was probably
correct to consider residency rather than employment to be the primary
condition for the loan forgiveness. A requirement simply to be employed
in any capacity whatever, including self-employment or as a student, is so
broad that it can hardly be regarded as a quid pro quo to the grantor. 47
It is merely a condition to assure that the subsidized education be
subsequently put to some-any-useful purpose. As argued above, this is
an implied condition of all scholarships. 14
Finally, it is noteworthy that the IRS' litigating position in Porten
seems curiously inconsistent with the IRS' own ruling position which finds
no quid pro quo in public-service legal and medical education grants
which require broad service conditions subsequent that are "in accordance
with usual patterns of employment." 49 It is surely no more unusual to
expect Alaska residents to remain in Alaska than to expect primary-care
physicians to practice primary-care medicine.

145. It can no longer be argued that the Alaska LRAP is "primarily for the benefit
of the grantor" despite the lack of any forbidden services, because as explained above
the primary-benefit test is a dead letter. See discussion supra part llI.B.
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a) (1995).
147. See supranote 123. The most natural interpretation of "payment for services"
is of course payment by the beneficiary of the services to the provider in a direct
exchange or quid pro quo. The language cannot be interpreted as referring to any and
all services of whatever kind. For example, it cannot apply to services performed for
grantee's own benefit, because that would read the scholarship exclusion out of the
statute altogether. Congress obviously did not intend to disqualify scholarships paid for
students to study and do research or writing because that is the very essence of a
qualifying scholarship.
148. See text accompanying notes 137-138.
149. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
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2. Public Service as Quid Pro Quo
It is quite clear that scholarship status would not be disturbed if
grantors earmarked certain scholarships solely for students who profess an
intention to enter the teaching profession,' public interest law, or
family-practice medicine for the poor. Grantors might go further and limit
eligibility to those who have already provided evidence of publicspiritedness through a prior history of charitable volunteer work. Such a
restriction would certainly not imperil the exempt status of a scholarship.
A still more effective way of ensuring that students will honor their
expressed intention to enter public service in the learned professions is to
wait until they have actually done so before awarding the scholarship.
However, because students need the scholarship in order to obtain the
professional education in the first place, it is impossible to apply the
actual-service test until the funds have already been advanced. Thus the
scholarship must be structured either in the form of loan forgiveness, or
as an outright grant which must be repaid if the service commitment is not
met, which is very nearly the same thing.' This is the essential reason
for structuring a scholarship as an LRAP.
If the IRS were to disallow a legal LRAP because of the requirement
of public interest service, it would rely upon Bingler v. Johnson and

Revenue Ruling 73-256, as it did in Porten and in its own NHSC
Information Letter. 52
As noted above,"5 3 Johnson was a case
involving an ongoing employer-employee relationship and is all but
150. See, e.g., Olick v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 479 (1979) (holding that stipend
to Native Alaskan for engagement in the Alaska Rural Teacher Training Corps was
excludible as scholarship where student teaching did not replace paid teachers and there

was no contractual commitment to later employment; "mere hope" of recruitment into
school system insufficient to defeat donative intent). But see Rev. Rul. 77-44, 1977-1
C.B. 355 (holding that grants to college students who profess willingness to serve in
public school system of particular state for two years after graduation are not tax-free
scholarships despite foundation's treatment of commitment as moral only). Revenue
Ruling 77-44 relied upon MacDonald v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 386 (1969) (holding that
study grant by IBM to BM employee was taxable despite absence of contractual
commitment to return to IBM employment; reasonable expectation sufficient). Reliance
on MacDonald seems inapposite because there the private employer was the grantor and
past services could reasonably be regarded as the direct quid pro quo.
151. See discussion supra part II.C.
152. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
153. See text accompanying supra note 63.
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irrelevant to a service requirement which is not for the benefit of any
grantor. 14
Revenue Ruling 73-256 remains the only published ruling in which a
general service requirement which did not benefit any grantor was held to
vitiate the scholarship exclusion. The validity of this ruling is very
doubtful for at least three reasons. First, the ruling was specifically
disapproved by Congress as a misinterpretation of Treasury Regulation §
1.117-4(c) when Congress enacted the predecessor of I.R.C. § 108(f). 5
Second, Revenue Ruling 73-256 was itself a complete reversal of the
IRS' longstanding position that the Mississippi and NDEA plans were
excludible scholarships. 56 Though purportedly based upon Bingler v.
Johnson,15 in fact, nothing at all in the Johnson decision supported the
IRS' volte-face.' The ruling's reliance upon the Supreme Court's "nostrings" and "quidpro quo" language was either a misunderstanding or a
pretext for some other reason which I have been unable to discover.
Third, the IRS' former pro-taxpayer position in private letter rulings
and general counsel memoranda for thirteen years from 1958 until 1971
was longstanding, well-reasoned," 9 and closer in time to the 1954
enactment of I.R.C. § 117 and the 1956 promulgation of the applicable
regulations.
Under general principles of interpreting administrative
regulations, all three factors lend weight to preferring the IRS' former
154. It is clear that the Johnson Court meant no more than that a scholarship cannot
be excluded if it is in fact a bargained-for exchange of money or money's worth for

services to a grantor. Even if the Court intended to include such "strings attached" as
public interest work for third parties-and it clearly did not so intend-such a statement

would be
155.
156.
157.

pure dictum because it is irrelevant to the Johnson fact situation.
See discussion supra part II.F.
See discussion supra part II.C.
See discussion supra part H.E.

158. In neither the NDEA nor the Mississippi plan LRAP was there any
employment, independent contractor, or other service relationship between the taxpayer

and either the ultimate grantor of the funds or the institution which selected the loan
recipient. Neither grantor had the right to supervise or direct the student's post-graduate

services, nor did either grantor receive any direct financial benefit from the taxpayer's
services, unlike the direct barter in Johnson. The only benefit received by the LRAP

grantors was the indirect and charitable one of helping to steer better medical and
educational services to the public. The recipient was at all times free to satisfy the loan

conditions through an extremely wide variety of possible employment (or selfemployment) of the recipient's own choice.

159. See discussion supra part II.C.
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position over its inexplicable change of mind in Revenue Ruling 73256.160

Even if Revenue Ruling 73-256 were to be regarded as good law, it
can be distinguished from the service requirements under legal LRAPs.
There is at least some financial nexus between the state government as
grantor and the state's interest in providing medical care to its poor
because the state might feel obliged to satisfy these needs in some other
way at greater cost. But there is no such nexus in legal LRAPs. There
NYU if one of its graduates
is no conceivable financial benefit to, say,
61
serves as a public defender in California.
The case for exclusion is even stronger where the sole condition of
loan forgiveness is financial need. Acceptance of a low salary from a
third-party employer is certainly not a service for the benefit of the
grantor.62
Such an LRAP differs from a traditional need-based
scholarship only insofar as need is measured ex post rather than ex ante.
To some extent, however, loan forgiveness based upon post-graduate need
alone can serve as a proxy for public service, and in fact at least three
legal LRAPs, those of NYU, Harvard and Yale, 63 are structured in
precisely this way.
The fact that law school LRAPs are not publicly funded as required
under I.R.C. § 108(f) should not affect the conclusion that they do not
involve services within the meaning of I.R.C. § 117(c). If the publicfunding requirement has any purpose at all other than simply to identify
the Mississippi and NDEA plans and their congeners, it could only be to
160. See Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U.
PA. L. RFv. 549, 562 n.95 (1985), who (in a slightly different context) sets forth ten
factors that the Supreme Court has considered in deciding the validity of administrative
interpretations, of which the first four seem directly relevant:

A partial list of the factors cited by the Court would include: (1)whether
the agency construction was rendered contemporaneously with the statute's
passage, see, e.g., NorwegianNitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S.

294, 315 (1933); (2) whether the agency's construction is of longstanding
application, see, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275
(1974); (3) whether the agency has maintained its position consistently (even
if infrequently), see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293 (1981); (4)
whether the public has relied on the agency's interpretation, see, e.g., Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965) ....

Id.
161. The reverse is probably true. Lawyers who are successful in private practice
are surely more likely to make contributions to their alma mater, or at least more
substantial ones.
162. Phillips & Hatfield agree that LRAPs with low income as the sole criterion
should probably be tax-free. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

163. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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insure that the benefit of the required services is directed to governmentapproved employment. If so, this would raise no obstacle because nearly
all legal aid and public defenders' offices are 64in fact already funded in
whole or in part by government contributions.
The following Part considers the quid pro quo test under the law of
gifts and charitable contributions and argues that the quid pro quo test for
scholarships should be the same, viz., whether the "quo" constitutes a
return of valuable goods or services to the donor.
3. Gifts and Charitable Contributions
Although as a technical matter scholarships have been governed by
I.R.C. § 117 rather than I.R.C. § 102 since 1954,'1 many courts have
been willing to consider the "detached and disinterested generosity" test
for gifts under Duberstein as relevant to scholarships, including the Porten
court. As noted above, 6 ' the Johnson Court's quid pro quo language
requiring the grantor to be "disinterested" echoes Duberstein, and
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) is itself in effect a reimportation of pre1939 gift law into the 1954 scholarship provision. 6 7 Most recently, in
Spiegelman v. Commissioner,68 the Tax Court rested its decision that
a postgraduate award was a "fellowship" upon Duberstein and upon a
lengthy discussion of pre-1954 law under which scholarships were tested
as gifts. 16 9
For tax purposes, the disinterested intent of the donor is not negated
merely because the gift requires the donee to meet some condition, unless
the condition is of direct economic benefit to the donor. For example, a
164. The Legal Services Corporation, for example, which funds hundreds of legal

aid societies throughout the country, was established by Congress in 1974 and received
a $400 million appropriation by Congress in 1994. It received another $242 million from
other sources of which about $48 million were donations from individuals or nongovernmental charities. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 7
(1994).
In addition, the Legal Aid Society of New York is the largest provider of both civil
and criminal legal services to the poor in New York City. See LEGAL AID SOCIETY,
1993 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1993). Its total funding for 1993 was $137.7 million, of which
only $6.4 million came from private donations. Id. at 57.
165. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 55.
167. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
168. 102 T.C. 394 (1994) (holding that postdoctoral research grant to geologist was
a fellowship and not subject to employment payroll taxes, though fellowship was taxable
because taxpayer was not a degree candidate).
169. See id. at 406.
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prenuptial transfer of valuable property on condition that the recipient
marry the transferor is excludible as a gift. 70 Payment of $5000 to a
nephew for fulfilling a promise to refrain from drinking, smoking and
swearing until age twenty-one is excludible as a gift rather than taxable as
compensation, because the conditions are for the benefit of the donee
rather than the donor.'
The fact that payment may be pursuant to an
enforceable contract is no barrier to gift treatment. For example, payment
of an enforceable pledge to a charity is a gift qualifying for the deduction
under I.R.C. § 170(a) even if actual payment is pursuant to contract or
even made under coercion after a change of mind.'" The origin of the
claim is a promise which is donative.
Similarly, bequests are excludible under I.R.C. § 102(a) even if the
beneficiary must fulfill conditions precedent or subsequent. For example,
a bequest is tax-free even if subject to a condition that the beneficiary
must marry, or not marry, or join the marines, or any other condition
which is of no economic benefit to the testator. If the bequest is in effect
the payment of a debt for valuable services performed, however, it is not
taxfree but rather includible as compensation. 17
Essentially the same tests of disinterested intent and lack of valuable
quid pro quo apply to determine whether a donation is deductible under
I.R.C. § 170(a) as a charitable contribution. 174Restricted or conditional
170. This is true even if the gift imposes a further condition that the bride must
abandon marital rights to the transferor's property. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B.
63. This remains true even though such a transfer is outside the literal terms of I.R.C
§ 1041 enacted in 1984 which treats transfers between spouses and former spouses
incident to divorce as gifts.

171. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); see also Smith v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 706 (1955), aff'd 249 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding parent's transfer of farmland to son enforceable where conditioned on son's
finishing school, abandoning plans to play professional football, and agreeing to develop
land).

172. See Commissioner v. RailJoint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 752 (1932).
173. See Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
decedent's bequest of corporate stock to lawyer in exchange for prior legal services
performed was taxable compensation, applying Duberstein test).

174. The House and Senate Reports on § 170 of the 1954 Code both define "gifts"
for purposes of the deduction for charitable contributions as payments "made with no
expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift." S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

A44 (1954).
The courts have applied interchangeably both the subjective intent test of Duberstein
and an objective quidpro quo test. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl.
1971) (allowing deductions for donor's bargain sales to churches, hospitals, and the Red
Cross because donor's motive was to foster donee's charitable activities but denying
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contributions are quite common and do not endanger the deduction in the

absence of an economic quid pro quo. For example, it is unquestionable
that one may deduct the value of a painting donated to a museum on
condition that the museum restore it or maintain it on display, despite the
fact that the condition imposes a requirement of services to be performed.
The services are for the benefit of the museum and the public, and provide
no economic quid pro quo to the donor.'"
Similarly, a gift to a
university to establish a professorial chair in a particular field of learning
does not constitute a forbidden quid pro quo even if the donor's name is

memorialized or favorite cause is furthered.' 76 The donor's satisfaction

from a restricted gift is altogether irrelevant'" unless it has the character
of an economic return.178 For example, in Revenue Ruling 81-307,111
the IRS held that a gift to a police department was deductible although it
was made to provide a reward for the apprehension of the murderer of the
donor's child, on the ground that the reward served a public purpose and

the benefit to the donor was "incidental."'8 "

Similarly, the millions of

dollars that Michael Milken has reportedly donated to foundations for
research on prostate cancer of which he is himself a victim are deductible
deduction for selling sewing machines to schools at a discount because donor's
predominate motive was to encourage students to use taxpayer's products in future
years). There, the Court of Claims stated that the subjective approach of disinterested
generosity need not be wrestled with and that the proper test is whether "the benefits
received, or expected to be received, are substantial, and meaning by that, benefits
greater than those that inure to the general public. . .

."

Id.

Cf. Hernandez v.

Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989) (stating that the words "'contribution or gift'.
. [are] intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and
payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services.")
175. Cf. Singer, 449 F.2d at 423 (stating that artists cannot deduct donations of
paintings to museums from income tax if the transfer provides benefits so substantial that
it creates quid pro quo to the donor).
176. See 2 BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 35.1.3 (2d ed. 1990).

177. It has been argued that the charitable contribution is questionable precisely
because such non-financial satisfactions and honors should be treated as a form of
compensation, but this is not the law. See generally Mark G. Kelman, Personal
DeductionsRevisited: Why They FitPoorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit
Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
178. Treating such restrictions as if they were an economic quid pro quo might
arguably undermine the deduction under I.R.C. § 170(a) altogether because it is an
implied condition of all charitable contributions that the recipient will use the gift for one
of its legitimate charitable aims.
179. 1981-2 C.B. 78.
180. See Joan O'C. Hamilton, Milken vs. Cancer, BUS. WK., Jan. 9, 1995, at 36-
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gifts even if his primary motive is to save his own life. An LRAP which
is intended solely to provide legal services to the needy seems more
selfless and charitable than the above examples, and should be regarded
afortiori as donative in nature.
By contrast, if the donor receives a direct financial benefit as a quid
pro quo, an otherwise qualifying gift is nondeductible. "I For example,
a contribution to a qualifying private school is not deductible if it is in
effect a payment of tuition for the benefit of the donor's child. n
If the quid pro quo test for scholarships under I.R.C. § 117(c) is
interpreted as equivalent to and in pari materia with that of I.R.C. §
170(a) and Bingler v. Johnson, as I think it should be, an illuminating
comparison can be made between the tax treatment of the grantor and the
grantee of a law school LRAP. It is beyond question that an individual
donor is entitled to deduct as a charitable contribution a gift to a
qualifying law school which is earmarked for the funding of LRAPs,
because the donor receives no economic value in exchange and is merely
specifying a charitable aim.1n It would then be a direct contradiction
to assert that the LRAP recipient should be taxed for fulfilling a quid pro
quo to that grantor, because the deduction is allowed only on condition
that no such quid pro quo exists.
Of course the private donor is only one grantor of the LRAP, and the
law school which selects the recipients and administers the grants is
another. Salaries are taxable even when paid by a nonprofit institution out
of previously deducted contributions. That an individual's endowment of
a law professorship may be deductible as a charitable gift does not prevent
the professor's salary from being taxable compensation. In the case of an
LRAP, however, it is difficult to see why the law school stands in any
different position than the individual grantor. If, say, NYU cancels tuition
loans in exchange for a graduate's employment for a California public
defender's office, it receives no more economic quidpro quo than Melvyn
and Barbara Weiss who provided the other half of the funds. Both
181. I.R.C. § 6115, enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,

now requires charities to disclose and value any quidpro quo contribution in excess of
$75. I.R.C. § 6115(b) defines a quid pro quo contribution as a contribution partly in
consideration for goods or services provided to the payor by the donee organization.
Intangible religious benefits are exempt if they are generally not sold in a commercial

transaction outside the donative context. Pub. L. No. 103-66, tit. XII, § 13173(a), 107
Stat. 312, 456.
182. Rev. Rul. 83-104, 1983-2 C.B. 46.

183. Unless the gift is earmarked for the donor's own child, and is merely an
attempt to deduct tuition by laundering the funds through a charitable organization. See
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grantors share the identical purpose of improving legal services to the
poor, and neither receives any other return than the satisfaction of doing
SO.
D. FinancialNeed
The courts have often regarded financial need tests as a factor pointing
toward eligibility as a scholarship and also as evidence of disinterested
charity. For example, in Lange v. Commissioner, " a stipend from
Antioch School of Law was held to be a tax-free scholarship despite the
fact that the student was required to perform services in a legal-aid clinic.
The Tax Court based its decision upon the fact that all students had to
perform similar services as part of the curriculum, and that financial aid
was awarded strictly on the basis of need."
Conversely, in Jamieson
v. Commissioner,"M the Tax Court found that payments to a teaching
assistant were compensation rather than a scholarship chiefly because the
payments were in return for services and without regard to financial
need.1 7
The fact that public interest LRAPs are in large part based upon
financial need helps to support their characterization as scholarships.
Nearly all scholarships today are need-tested at the front end. 8
Students who have the income or assets to pay the full price of higher
education at the time of admission are generally required to do so, and this
ineligibility generally applies to cancelable LRAPs as well.' 89 However,
financial need, like commitment to public service, is more accurately
measured after the student's education is completed. If the student enters
low-paying work upon graduation, the burden of repayment is greater, and
the justification for need-based, tax-free, educational loan relief is greater
than that for an initial outright grant. If a student becomes suddenly
wealthy after graduation, an outright grant which might have funded a
needy student instead has in effect been wasted.
184. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (1981).

185. Id. at 1422.
186. 51 T.C. 635 (1969).
187. See also Rockswold v. United States, 620 F.2d 166 (1980) (holding that
medical fellowship was taxable as compensation for services in part because payments
not based on financial need); Weissfisch v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 391
(1974) (same regarding medical residency).
188. See generally The Nation, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION ALMANAC,

Aug. 28, 1991, at 3, cited in Joseph Dodge, Scholarships Underthe Income Tax Act, 46
TAX LAW. 697, 709 n.64 (1993).
189. See generally NAPIL REPORT, supra note 23.
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The point is particularly applicable to legal education. Senator
Bumper's explanation of Senate Bill 914 makes the point very clearly.',,
The median salary of 1991 law graduates who took public service work
was $25,000, while those who went into private practice earned a median
salary of $51,000.191 The enormous burden of law school loans is a
great deterrent to those who might otherwise enter public interest work,
and this 1is
the principal reason why so many law schools have instituted
92
LRAPs.
The chief problem with characterization of an LRAP as a scholarship
is that the financial aid is provided after the student's graduation, and
sometimes many years afterwards. This problem is the subject of the next
Part.
E. Timing: Can PostgraduateAid be a Scholarship?
Treasury Regulation § 1.117-3 defines "scholarship" as "an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an
undergraduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his
studies."" 9 The IRS might take the position that financial aid paid long
after graduation is neither 'paid to a student' nor 'intended to aid the
student in pursuing his studies' because the studies have long been
completed. There is apparently no published authority on this timing
question regarding scholarships, although there is one ruling in the related
area of employer-provided educational assistance under I.R.C. § 127.194
In PLR 8714035, gs the IRS ruled that tuition loan cancellations
190. 139

CONG.

REc. S5647-5648 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement by Sen.

Bumpers); see supra text accompanying notes 8-13.

191. Id. at S5648.
192. Id. (citing figures supplied by NAPIL REPORT, supra note 23).
193. The proposed regulations intended to apply to grants made after 1986 define
"scholarship" in much the same way. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(3), 53 Fed.

Reg. 21,688 (1988) (first sentence).
194. I.R.C. § 127 grants an exclusion of up to $5250 per year of employer-provided
educational assistance provided that it is pursuant to a written plan and is
nondiscriminatory. I.R.C. § 127 expired by its terms on Dec. 31, 1994. However,

Congress may reinstate the provision retroactively, as it has done several times in the
past.
The exclusion was repealed in 1988 for graduate-level courses which might lead to
an advanced degree by § 4001(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3643, but this restriction was lifted two years later
by § 11403 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388, 1473.

195. Jan. 2, 1987.
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provided by a college to a full-time teacher did not qualify for the
exclusion under I.R.C. § 127 because (among other reasons) the
cancellations took place after the teacher had already completed her
Master's degree and therefore did not provide any incentive for her to
continue her studies.1 16 It appears significant that the ruling did not state
as an additional ground that the timing of the loan cancellations prevented
scholarship treatment." 9 The ruling is unlikely to present a significant
obstacle to excludibility of LRAPs as scholarships because the timing issue
is probably not the same as it relates to I.R.C. §§ 127 and 117. For
example, loan cancellation could be used to circumvent the annual
exclusion limit of $5250 by deferring the excess to a later year through a
loan to be forgiven when the employee will be within that dollar limit.
Congress has demonstrated concern for this issue in the legislative history
of I.R.C. § 127.1
The IRS has never shown any concern for the timing issue as it relates
to scholarships. Disallowance of the scholarship exclusion for the
Mississippi and NDEA plans was based solely upon the quid pro quo issue
without mention of any timing problem.' 9 Both plans involved loan
forgiveness which took place long after the participants' education was
completed.
Under both plans, as under law school LRAPs, the
forgiveness takes place during the participants' professional working
career. In effect the loan-cancellation scholarships were treated as
equivalent to outright grants, and correctly so because there is little if any
economic difference between an outright grant which must be repaid if a
196. It also did not qualify because it was not pursuant to a written plan as required
under I.R.C. § 127(b).
197. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8714035 (Jan. 2, 1987) also ruled that the loan cancellations

were not a scholarship because they were provided inexchange for services as a full-time
employee, and in fact the college reported the amounts as wages on a Form W-2.
198. See H.R. REP. No. 1049, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1984) which states:
The committee recognizes that an employee cannot avoid the [then]

$5,000 limit by electing to forego receipt of reimbursements to another taxable
year because the employee is in constructive receipt of the amounts in the
current year. In addition, the committee intends that employers will report to
an employee, who separates from service with the employer during the taxable

year, the value of the educational assistance benefits received by the employee
during the year.
Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

condition subsequent is not met, and a loan which will be canceled if the
condition is met.'
Proposed Regulation § 1.117-6(c)(3) states that "[a] scholarship or
fellowship grant also may be in the form of a reduction in the amount
owed by the recipient to an educational organization for tuition, room and
board, or any other fee." This provision has no analog in the former
regulations, but it does not appear intended to make any change in prior
law. 20
For example, a tuition loan which converts to a grant upon the
achievement of a required grade average, or successful completion of
studies, would clearly have been excludible under any version of prior
law. The current express recognition of loan cancellation as a means of
awarding scholarships, without any explicit concern over timing, suggests
that the exclusion applies even if the forgiveness takes place after
graduation, and perhaps even if long afterwards.
The phrase 'owed to an educational organization' may raise more
difficult questions, however. If the law school forgives amounts which
are owed to itself, the forgiveness seems clearly within the proposed
regulations. Typically, however, the law school itself is not the holder of
the note representing the original student loans, but rather a financial
institution which has disbursed funds to the school and/or the student at
the direction of the school. The law school either makes the graduate
cancelable interim loans with which to make payments on the original
student loans, or outright grants of cash for the same purpose.
Taking the interim-loan format first, such loans are 'owed to an
educational institution,' but they raise another timing question because
they are not merely forgiven many years after graduation, but also
advanced after the student's studies are completed. Thus it might be
questioned whether the interim loan forgiveness is a reduction of an
amount owed "for tuition, room and board, or any other fee." On the
other hand, LRAP interim loans are in effect simply a refinancing of the
original student loans and can plausibly be regarded as relating back to
them. A good analogy may be found in the rules for deducting qualified
home mortgage interest under I.R.C. § 163(h). Qualifying acquisition
200. Except for a different timing problem: for tax purposes, a non-qualifying
scholarship grant is taxable in the year of receipt, but a non-qualifying scholarship loan
is not taxable until the year in which it is canceled.
201. Nor does the change in the regulations defining "scholarship" which formerly
referred to "student" and now to "individual." The immediately preceding first sentence
of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(3) which defines "scholarship or fellowship" reads:
"(i) In general Generally, a scholarship or fellowship grant is a cash amount paid or

allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid such individual in the pursuit of
study or research."
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indebtedness under I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i) includes any refinancing of
such indebtedness even though the refinancing is not for the purpose of
acquiring a residence because the residence is already owned. The
refinancing replaces the original acquisition loan and is quite sensibly
treated as relating back to it as a substitute. Similar treatment for interimloan LRAPs seems reasonable, if not compelling.
A related problem is raised by the fact that LRAP cancellation is not
ordinarily made pursuant to the terms of the original student loan, in
contrast to the Mississippi and NDEA plans and as required under I.R.C.
§ 108(f)(1). Presumably the purpose of this limitation' is to ensure
that the loan forgiveness relates directly back to the educational assistance
which was "to aid [the] individual in the pursuit of study or research,"
and is not a merely an employment arrangement. However, this should
not present an insuperable problem if the LRAP is already in place at the
time the student begins law school. There is no apparent reason why the
student cannot rely upon the LRAP program when incurring the
independent student loans and in effect look to the LRAP as present
assurance of financial aid for current studies. It should be noted,
however, that this argument may weaken the case for exclusion for
students whose LRAP programs allow them to participate even if they
had already graduated before the LRAP program was instituted.
Cash grants should be treated in the same way as interim-loan
cancellation and reduction of original debt because all three have the same
economic effect. Assurance that cash grants and interim loans will
actually be used to pay down the educational debt is generally provided by
limiting eligibility to participants who are currently in compliance with
their loan obligations. 3
If loan funds are provided by a lending
institution at the direction of a law school, the benefit to the student is the
same whether the LRAP makes payments directly to the participant or to
the lending institution on behalf of the participant. Either way, from the
participant's perspective, the cash payments are economically equivalent
to a reduction of debt held by the law school itself. From the law
school's point of view the result is also the same. If the school has
already received funds from a third-party lender on the student's behalf
and refunds the amounts either to the lender or to the student, it has
simply provided a rebate and retains the remaining net proceeds (if any)
as the final price of tuition. If the school itself holds the debt and reduces
202. Assuming that it has any purpose at all other than to loosely identify the

Mississippi, NDEA, and similar plans to which it applies.
203. See NAPIL REPORT, supranote 23. Note also that for scholarships generally,
there is no need to trace particular grant dollars to particular expenditures for qualified
tuition. Prop. Reg. § 1.117-6(e).
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it, the school will similarly end up with recovery of the remaining debt (if

any) as the final price.
1. Exclusion Limited to Tuition
The scholarship exclusion for LRAPs must be limited to loans for
tuition, and possibly for law school tuition alone. If the LRAP also pays
down loans for living expenses, there is no argument for the exclusion
because after 1986, I.R.C. § 117(b)(2) has limited the exclusion to tuition
and fees. Some LRAP programs include financial assistance for
undergraduate loans as well. To the extent such loans were made for
living expenses there is again no argument for exclusion under I.R.C. §
117.
This is true despite the fact that I.R.C. § 108(f) has not been amended
to conform to I.R.C. § 117(b)(2), so that loan cancellation programs
which qualify under I.R.C. § 108(f) apparently still permit exclusion of
forgiven loans for living expenses. Congress seems to have erred in
failing to conform the two provisions.'
Whether LRAP forgiveness of undergraduate tuition loans might
qualify for the scholarship exclusion is a more difficult question. There
is no reason in principle why a law school cannot grant a scholarship for
undergraduate education, and if a scholarship may be granted for legal
education after graduation, the same should arguably be true for
undergraduate tuition. On the other hand, the timing issue makes this
doubtful. It seems difficult to argue that post-J.D. LRAPs further the
participant's undergraduateeducation which was already completed years
earlier. Certainly it would be unusual for an undergraduate to know of
and rely upon a law school LRAP for current financial aid in college,
assuming arguendo that such reliance is a proper test for the
exclusion.'
On the other hand, LRAP benefits for undergraduate
204. This difference cannot-be defended, and is probably an oversight due to the
original error of not codifing I.R.C. § 108(0t at I.R.C. § 117 where it belongs. See
supra note 71. Note that Senator Bumpers' proposed amendments to I.R.C. § 108 would
have allowed LRAP recipients a bigger exclusion than is available under I.R.C. § 117.

See 139 CONG. REc. S5647 (daily ed. May 6, 1993).
205. The definition of "scholarship" under the regulations as aid to "further" the
recipient's studies can be read as implying that an element of inducement to study is
required. It is by no means clear, however, that any such requirement exists.

For

example, scholarships are often awarded in situations where it is clear that the recipient
will engage in the contemplated studies in any event, and the aid is intended merely to
lure the student from one school to another. Also, the "honoraria" type of scholarship
which civic groups give to high school students ordinarily cannot influence the recipient's
educational choices because the amounts are usually too small and the timing too late.
But their exclusion as scholarships has never been questioned.
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tuition loans may be regarded as furthering the participants' legal
education, because willingness to take on law school indebtedness is likely
to be influenced in part by the level of their college debts. The case for
exclusion is less strong than for law school tuition indebtedness, but it is
still good.
2. Allocation to Law School Tuition
Because the exclusion under I.R.C. § 117(b)(2) applies only to LRAP
benefits to the extent they are allocable to qualified tuition and fees, an
allocation problem arises where the LRAP pays down loans incurred for
living expenses as well. If LRAP assistance for undergraduate tuition
loans also does not qualify for the exclusion, a second allocation problem
arises.
If LRAPs want to maximize the exclusion for their participants, it
would appear advisable for them to stipulate that loan forgiveness and/or
cash payments apply first to law school tuition loans, then to
undergraduate tuition loans, and finally to loans for living expenses. This
would be possible in cases where the LRAP does not cover the full
amount of a participant's current obligations. For example, suppose that
the participant's current obligations are $600 per month, of which $400
is for law school tuition loans, $100 for law school living expense loans,
and $100 for undergraduate tuition loans. If the participant qualifies for
$200 per month in LRAP benefits, it would be desirable for the participant
and the school to allocate the entire $200 of benefits to the law school
tuition loans." °
On the other hand, if the LRAP pays the full amount of the
participant's current obligations, such a stipulation would have no effect
because the participant must make payments currently on all loans at once.
To determine the correct amount of the exclusion, it would be necessary
to make a pro-rata allocation of the LRAP assistance among the various
loans. Using the preceding example, if the participant qualifies for $600
of monthly benefits, the $400 allocable to law school tuition would be
excludible, and probably the $100 of college tuition as well, but not the
$100 allocable to living expenses.
Even if the exclusion is limited to law school tuition loan assistance,
it would still be a very valuable benefit because it appears that at least
two-thirds of the average law graduate's indebtedness is due to law school
206. This approach might be permissible under Prop. Reg. § 1.117-6(e), supranote
203. However, the IRS might demand a pro-rata allocation. The most effective way to
avoid this result would be for the LRAP to pay the entire benefit directly to the holder
of the law school tuition loan.
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tuition loans.' 7 Thus even if LRAP aid were allocated to all of a
graduate's student debts on a pro-rata basis, the exclusion would probably
shield an average of at least two-thirds of the assistance.
F. Is an LRAP a Tax-Free PriceAdjustment?
A bargain purchase of goods or services is ordinarily taxfree provided
that it is not a disguised payment of compensation. A subsequent rebate
of purchase price is also generally tax-free as a return of capital. Where
the rebate arises from a sale of property on credit and takes the form of
a reduction of debt, no income from cancellation of indebtedness arises
and the reduction is treated as a tax-free adjustment to the purchase price
under I.R.C. § 108(e)(5)."0
Although there appears to be no authority
on point, there is no reason why a price rebate for services should not be
treated in the same way. Thus a reduction of purchase-money debt by a
seller of services should generally be taxfree. Scholarships may be
regarded as a subset of such transactions.
If loan forgiveness under an LRAP fails to qualify as a scholarship,
it is presumably taxable only if it is COD income under I.R.C. §
61(a)(12). Whether tuition loan forgiveness is taxable as COD is very
problematic, however, for at least three closely related reasons: (1) it is
unclear whether cancellation of debts incurred for services alone rather
than money or property are taxable as COD; (2) even if debts incurred for
services are subject to the COD rules, the value of tuition (and many other
services) is so uncertain as to render doubtful the proper measure of
income; and (3) forgiveness of tuition debt is more plausibly viewed as a
price reduction than as an accession to wealth.
The essential reason for taxing COD is that if the taxpayer has
borrowed money taxfree and fails to repay it, the taxpayer is wealthier to
the extent of the untaxed loan proceeds. It follows that unless the
borrower has received valuable loan proceeds in exchange for the debt,
cancellation of the debt does not result in any enrichment, and the courts
207. At Stanford Law School, for example, average indebtedness for 1994 graduates

was $55,000, of which $45,000 was for law school and $10,000 for undergraduate
education. Of the $45,000 law school debt, 87% or $39,150 was for tuition loans. Thus
71% of total indebtedness was for law school tuition. Telephone Interview with Frank
Brucato, Associate Dean of Stanford Law School (Mar. 2, 1995). If the analysis in text

is correct, at least 71% of LRAP benefits would be excludible on a pro-rata basis even
without making special allocations of benefits to law school tuition.

Graduates of New

York Law School appear to have a similar average breakdown of indebtedness, and the
same is probably true at most law schools. The largest item of indebtedness by far is law
school tuition.
208. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
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have generally agreed. 9 It is clear that money and property count as
loan proceeds for this purpose, but there are no reported cases of COD
income arising from debts incurred for services, and it is uncertain
whether I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) should apply at all in this situation.2"' The
enjoyment of services does not result in any increase in the taxpayer's
wealth or ability to pay tax, and for that reason cancellation of a purchasemoney debt for services is arguably not a taxable enrichment either.2"
Furthermore, the value of services is often not ascertainable in any
objective manner. The fact that a price has been agreed upon between
buyer and service provider does not necessarily fix the value of services,
especially where the provider may charge vastly different prices to
different customers for the same services.2 2 A public figure may
charge a "standard" speaking fee, but will often cut the price in half or to
nothing at all depending on the audience addressed. General Colin Powell
is reported to charge speaking fees of $60,000,21 but it is impossible to
determine the objective value of his speeches, or of anyone else's. For
tax purposes its value can only be whatever the buyer actually pays.
Physicians and surgeons often charge vastly different fees for identical
services depending upon the patient's ability to pay. Tuition is very
similar. The "sticker price" for tuition at a private college may be, say,
$20,000, but only the wealthy actually pay it. Middle-class students may
209. See generally Richard C.E. Beck, Is Compromise of a Tax Liability Itself
Taxable?A Problem of Circularityin the Logic of Taxation, 14 VA. TAX REv. 153, 165-

173 (1994).
210. The American Law Institute's Draft of a Federal Income Tax Statute proposed
a codification of the COD income rules which would have defined "indebtedness" as

including only those obligations which are incurred for cash, or for the acquisition of
property where the debt was included in basis. See Stanley S. Surrey & William C.
Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute: Gross Income,
Deductions,Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 761, 815-16 (1953).
211. It is unclear whether a receipt of unearned services should be included in the
tax base at all, whether directly or by way of debt cancellation. A promotional prize of
cash or property is unquestionably taxable, but it seems doubtful whether a promotional
free movie, dinner, or massage should be taxed if it is nontransferable. See Dodge supra
note 188, at 708 n.59. A receipt of services should of course be taxable if the services
have produced some asset which can be transferred for value, or if the taxpayer has a
real or implied option to take cash instead (barter), as for example if the services are
earned (nonqualifying fringe benefits).
212. For example, some airlines offer "compassion" fares which are half or less

than regular fares in order to enable people to visit relatives on short notice in an
emergency. The price reduction is certainly not income.
213. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Powell Deftly Deflecting Questions on Presidency,
N.Y. TIMm, Feb. 1, 1995, at A12.
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routinely receive "scholarships" based on need which reduce the price to,
say, $10,000, and a poor but able student may be charged nothing at all.
The purpose of all such cases of differential pricing is to capture consumer
surplus. 2 14 The agreed price has no necessary relation to objective
value.
Cost to the school provides no clear measure of value either. All
tuition, both public and private, is subsidized by private endowment or
public taxes so that not even those who pay the full sticker price actually
pay the full cost of higher education.215 No one believes that such
subsidies are taxable, but they do not differ in substance from a
scholarship.2 16
The exclusion for scholarships is thus justifiable on a ground which
is wholly independent of the exclusion for gifts. The actual price paid, net
of scholarship, should be regarded as the true price of tuition for tax
purposes and any discount, whether hidden or explicit, should be ignored
altogether. 1 7 It is noteworthy that this view has been explicitly adopted
by the Office of Management and Budget which dropped scholarships
from its list of tax expenditures, explaining:

from a strictly economic point of view, scholarships . . . are
either gifts not conditioned on the performance of services, or
they are "rebates" of educational costs by the institutions in which
students are enrolled. Thus . . . the exclusion is not a tax
214. One cannot ask the well-off to pay more than the "sticker price," and so it

must be artificially increased to the maximum that the richest customers are willing to
pay. In the tuition example, it would be more realistic to say the "true" price is $10,000
if that is what most students actually pay.
215. On the other hand, the government's measurement of such subsidies apparently

makes a pro-rata allocation to each student of the entire cost of the educational
institution, including the salaries of professors who are engaged largely in research and
the cost of libraries and laboratories which are necessary for their research. See DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (1987),

cited in Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the FederalIncome Tax Base, 28 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 63, 71 n.25 (1991). It may be questioned whether the subsidy is in fact the
other way around, for there is no clear reason why students should pay for research

which may be of little or no direct value to themselves. To the extent this may be true,
tuition is overcharged rather than subsidized.
216. See Crane, supra note 215, at 71. Professor Crane rightly points out that it
is difficult to justify taxing tuition which is actually charged but not paid when the
"invisible subsidy" is tax-free.
217. See Dodge, supra note 188, at 701-11. Professor Dodge believes that although
gifts should be taxable, scholarships should not be taxable because they are merely a
"bargain purchase."
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expenditure; the reference law does not include
218 either gifts or
price reductions in a taxpayer's gross income.
If this is so, it follows that cancellation of a debt for tuition simply adjusts
the purchase price and should not be taxable quite apart from I.R.C. §
117. According to this point of view, after Congress repealed the
scholarship exclusion in 1986 for amounts other than qualified tuition and
fees, there may no longer be any need for I.R.C. § 117(a) at all. 2" 9
A reduction of tuition debt by the school as lender and holder of the
note should clearly qualify as a tax-free price reduction. The school has
advanced nothing except its own services and facilities of unascertainable
value. The case is not different if the rebate is in cash, however, because
a purchase-money tuition loan from a third-party lender has still provided
no cash to the borrower. The school receives the borrowed money, and
the borrower has again received nothing except the school's services.
The price-rebate argument would not apply, however, to the extent the
rebate is earned by the recipient's barter of services in exchange.'
This would appear to reopen the entire quid pro quo question which has
plagued I.R.C. § 117. However, if the price-rebate approach provided an
opportunity to reexamine the question without the accumulated baggage of
erroneous law under I.R.C. § 117, the results might be very different. A
taxable barter should be found only where the recipient performs valuable
services for the direct economic benefit of the grantor (or seller, under the
price-rebate analysis), as is the law for charitable contributions and gifts
generally. The public interest (or low-income) conditions which LRAP
participants must meet simply do not fit this description.

218.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES,

FISCAL YEAR 1985, at G-28, quoted in Crane, supra note 215, at 68.
219. The price-paid argument would not apply to cash scholarships which are used
for living expenses, because the face amount of cash is of course its value, unlike the
face amount of tuition. Pre-1986 I.R.C. § 117 therefore provided a valuable exclusion
for such amounts. But scholarships for such amounts are no longer excluded by current
I.R.C. § 117, and the price-reduction theory is therefore now coterminous with the
scholarship exclusion except for the exclusion under § 117(b)(2)(B) for books, supplies,
and equipment.
220. See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (holding that barter of legal services for
housepainting services is taxable on both sides to the extent of fair market value of

services received).
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G. Is an LRAP a Gift?
The scholarship exclusion requires donative intent, or at least the same
absence of any quid pro quo as for gifts and charitable contributions, and
The question may then arise, why
LRAPs appear to meet this.2 1
should an LRAP not be excludible as a gift under I.R.C. § 102(a) in case
it fails for some other reason (e.g., timing) to qualify as a scholarship?
According to the Treasury Regulations § 1.117-3(a) and (c), the terms
"scholarship" and "fellowship" do not include amounts provided by an
individual where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic
considerations.'
Such grants are excludible as gifts under I.R.C. §
102(a),' however, which is a more favorable treatment because it
removes the grant from the restrictions of I.R.C. § 117.1 a The evident
purpose of the regulation is twofold: (1) to protect intra-family gifts
which happen to be for educational expenses from the limitations of I.R.C.
§ 117; and (2) to safeguard the limitations of I.R.C. § 117 from end-run
claims that ordinary institutional grants are fully excludible gifts. And yet
the regulations do not state that all institutional grants must be tested by
the scholarship rules alone. Although tax-free gifts are ordinarily made
by individuals out of personal affection or charity, there is no statutory
barrier to prevent an institution such as a law school from making gifts
which might be excluded under I.R.C. § 102(a). For example, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Kaiser" that strike benefits paid
by a union to a nonunion striker were tax-free gifts where there was no
requirement that the recipient perform any services such as picketing, and
where the benefits were made out of charitable concern that the recipient
had no means of supporting himself.'
Nor is the fact that LRAP
221. See supra notes 165-183 and accompanying text.
222. The same statement appears in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(3), 53 Fed.
Reg. 21,688 (1988) which is intended to apply to post-1986 scholarships.
223. See Rev. Rul. 61-66, 1961-1 C.B. 19 (holding that grant by individual to a

university to disburse to a particular professor while on leave without pay in order to
enable him to pursue research is excludible in full as a gift, and is not a fellowship

because university merely acted as a conduit for individual's gift to another designated
individual).
224. Such as the limitations to degree candidates and to qualified tuition and fees
under I.R.C. §§ 117(a) & (b). On the other hand, such a grant may be subject to gift
tax to the extent the educational expense exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A) does not
apply.
225. 363 U.S. 299 (1960).
226. Compare Osborne v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1895 (1995) (holding

that strike payments were not gifts because, inter alia, they were not made on the basis
of financial need).
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payments are made pursuant to contract a necessary barrier to gift status
because, as noted above, a payment pursuant to an enforceable promise
may still be a gift, as in the case of a charitable pledge.'
Tax-free gifts may also be made by means of cancellation of debt, as
for example when a father cancels a debt owed to him by his son. The
IRS has ruled at least twice, in Revenue Ruling 78-46, 2 and in PLR
8839026," that cancellation of debts to governmental agencies is
nontaxable for reasons of general public welfare when the reason for
cancellation is relief of hardship."30
On the other hand, although LRAP payments are based on financial
need, they are not for relief of hardship or poverty as in the above cases.
Moreover, even though LRAP benefits would probably pass the test of
"detached and disinterested generosity," they are recurrent sources of
funds upon which the recipient can rely and might thus be vulnerable to
the analysis applied to tips and tokes: the recipient can and probably does
regard them the equivalent of additional compensation." Tips are paid
to the service provider by the beneficiary of the services, however, unlike
the LRAP situation in which the payor receives no benefit. Also, the
mere fact that the LRAP takes the form of a recurrent allowance should
not of itself prevent gift status. For example, if a wealthy patron were to
support an artist by means of a fixed allowance, this should be excludible
provided that no services are required in return.
And yet if LRAP benefits were treated as gifts, the entire amounts
would presumably be taxfree, including amounts reflecting loans for
student living expenses. In view of the general resemblance of LRAPs to
scholarships, it seems unlikely that a court would permit the limitations of
I.R.C. § 117(b) to be circumvented in this way. Thus it appears that the
only really good argument that LRAPs are not gifts is that they are
227. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
228. Rev. Rul. 78-46, 1978-1 C.B. 22 (waiving requirement to repay interim benefit

of $3000 paid to surviving dependent of law enforcement officer under the Public Safety
Officers' Benefits Act after determination of ineligibility for final benefit of $50,000 for
officers killed in the line of duty held taxfree because it was in the nature of relief
payment for the purposes of general welfare).
229. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8839026 (June 29, 1988) (holding waiver by Veterans
Administration of taxpayer's repayment obligation of $15,784 on a defaulted VA-insured
home mortgage pursuant to its authority to do so in hardship cases held tax-free, citing
as support Rev. Rul. 78-46.).
230. Governmental aid to the poor is generally taxfree, such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and foodstamps. Some commentators think the exclusion unjustified,
however. See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare
Benefits, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 785 (1993).
231. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 30, 10.2.2.
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scholarships. This conclusion reinforces the analysis that LRAPs are
excludible, because the government should not be able to have it both
ways, denying gift status on the ground of preemption by I.R.C. § 117,
and denying scholarship statusz2 on the ground of timing. If an LRAP is
not a scholarship, it is a gift.
H. Horizontal Equity
It might be objected that from the point of view of the participant, the
enjoyment of loan reduction or its cash equivalent is simply additional
compensation for public interest employment. If LRAP participants are
not taxed, co-workers who receive the same salary for the same work but
no LRAP assistance will be overtaxed by comparison, thus violating
horizontal equity. The argument has some merit, but it would apply
equally well to many other tax benefits which are fully justifiable even
though they are not evenly distributed.
LRAP payments, even as cash grants, cannot be considered
compensation from the public interest employer because the employer
neither receives them nor has any control over them. The employer
cannot, for example, reduce the LRAP payments and put them to other
uses such as hiring additional personnel. In many cases the employer
could not pay the amounts to participants even if received directly because
it would violate fixed salary scales governing much public employment.
The horizontal equity argument thus boils down to whether the
exclusion is unfair merely because it is not universal. This argument
would call into question the fairness of I.R.C. § 117 itself, because not all
students receive scholarships, and the same student might be eligible for
quite different amounts at different institutions. If these inequalities do not
offend horizontal equity, neither should the identical inequalities entailed
by LRAPs. Scholarship status should not be denied to an LRAP just
because not all schools offer them, or because those which do so offer
them in varying amounts.
Exclusion of public-service LRAPs for tuition loans is not only
justifiable under existing law, it is good policy as well, because taxing
them undercuts carefully targeted incentives to provide much-needed
public services to the poor in favor of the far more diffuse public interest
of the fise.

232. See generally Laura Duncan, Books Hit Back For Some Lucky Students, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 11, 1992, at 3. At least one LRAP probably is excludible as a
gift rather than a scholarship. The student body of the University of Minnesota Law
School voted to establish an LRAP funded by its own surplus funds. This would appear
to be a gift from fellow students rather than an institutional grant.

1996]

LRAP'S FOR PUBLIC-IN"EREST LAWYERS

I. Compliance
Because of the uncertainty as to whether LRAPs are taxable, and if
so to what extent, compliance is probably very low in this area. As
pointed out above, 3 some law schools report LRAP assistance on Form
1099 and others do not. In principle, it is the recipient who must
determine whether the assistance qualifies as a scholarship, and it seems
likely that many participants simply do not report the assistance unless
they receive a Form 1099. If the IRS would issue a clear ruling on the
taxability of LRAPs it would then be in a position to insist upon
compliance.
The conclusions above suggest that LRAP assistance should be treated
as a tax-free scholarship at least to the extent of amounts allocable to law
school tuition loans. The IRS should issue a ruling to this effect, and then
insist that law schools send Forms 1099 reflecting only such loan
forgiveness or cash grants as may exceed the amount allocable to tuition.
As matters now stand, it appears that some LRAP participants are
overtaxed, and others undertaxed. If the IRS does not publish a ruling
which exempts at the very least the LRAP amounts allocable to law school
tuition, Congress should consider remedial legislation as it did following
Revenue Ruling 73-256.3
IV. CONCLUSIONS

LRAP benefits should be excludible from income under current I.R.C.
§ 117 as scholarships to the extent they are a rebate of qualifying tuition
and fees. Even apart from I.R.C. § 117, LRAPs (and scholarships
generally) should be excludible on the ground that such price reductions
do not properly belong in the tax base at all. The fact that the grantor

233. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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may place conditions on the scholarship or rebate should be irrelevant
except to the extent such conditions provide a direct and measurable
economic benefit to the grantor, as under current law governing the
deductibility of charitable contributions. "3

235. These conclusions do not apply to LRAPs which are provided directly by
public interest employers to their own employees, however, such as the cash LRAP
benefits provided by NAPIL to its own staff. This is because the recipient is providing
employment services directly to the grantor, and the LRAP is in effect a nonqualifying
fringe benefit.
Even Senator Bumper's proposed legislation would not cover this
situation. See 139 CONG. REc. S5647, S5649 (daily ed. May 6, 1993).
I.R.C. § 127 which grants an exclusion of up to $5250 per year of employerprovided educational assistance might apply, however, assuming that Congress reinstates
I.R.C. § 127 which by its terms expired December 31, 1994. On the other hand, PLR
8714035 provides some authority to the contrary on the issue of timing. See supranotes
194-198 and accompanying text.

